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STATUTORY ANTI-CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Maciej Bernatt and Michał Ziółkowski† 
Abstract: The article aims at demonstrating that unconstitutional results, marking 
an illiberal transformation may be achieved by means of a series of statutory amendments 
outside the constitutional amendment procedure, when the guardian of the constitution is 
deactivated. In other words, the evasion of the constitution becomes a means of illiberal 
change of the legal system. This process is referred to as “statutory anti-constitutionalism.” 
The article offers a detailed analysis of the legal methods which are used to evade the 
constitution. These include excessive use of transitional and intertemporal provisions in 
the statutes, shortening vacatio legis, shortening of constitutionally-determined terms of 
public institutions and creation of “mirror competences” or “mirror bodies” via statute in 
order to circumvent the activity of the constitutional bodies. The article is based on the 
2015-2018 Polish experience. 
Cite as: Maciej Bernatt & Michał Ziółkowski, Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism, 28 WASH. 
INT’L L.J. 487 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Liberal constitutionalism is one of biggest achievements of the post-
World War II world. It came into being as a result of the combined efforts of 
citizens, politicians, and courts in many different countries. It is true that this 
type of constitutionalism, built on freedom as a basic value within a system of 
checks and balances, limitations on government, and effective judicial review, 
has never been universally or ideally implemented around the world. It may 
also be argued that liberal constitutionalism has not provided a sufficient 
response to growing economic inequalities.1 Therefore, one should not 
discount the emergence of new forms of constitutionalism approaching the 
limitation of government powers and human rights protection from a different 
angle. However, for the moment, liberal constitutionalism continues to offer 
the best theoretical framework to protect human freedom, dignity, and 
equality.2  
                                                          
†  Dr. hab. Maciej Bernatt is an Assistant Professor and Head of the Department of European 
Economic Law at the Faculty of Management of the University of Warsaw. Dr. Michał Ziółkowski is an 
Assistant Professor at Kozminski University, Warsaw. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 
Advanced Workshop on the Resurgence of Executive Powers in the Age of Populism (June 21–22, 2018), 
Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. The authors are grateful to Professor Cheng-yi Huang 
for creating this opportunity. 
1  For more in the context of liberal constitutionalism turbulences, see Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, 
Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369 (2018).  
2  For more about on modern constitutionalism’s triangle of values, see, Susanne Baer, Dignity Liberty, 
Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 417 (2009). 
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Today, liberal constitutionalism is under pressure in several areas 
around the globe.3 This is happening despite the twentieth century’s progress 
in human rights protection and the growing convergence of national and 
international constitutional values. In particular, several countries in Central 
Europe face the most serious rule of law crises since the adoption of their post-
transition democratic constitutions. In Hungary, the constitutional order has 
been subject to deep transformation. Both the Hungarian Constitutional 
Tribunal’s competences and a number of fundamental constitutional rights 
were limited.4 In Poland, the constitutional order has been significantly 
changed outside the formal amendment procedure, just after the Polish 
Constitutional Court had been paralyzed.5 
In 2017-2018, the European Union formally accused Poland of a 
serious breach of the rule of law principle.6 In particular, the European 
Commission opened proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU).7 In addition, it brought an infringement case against 
Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union, accusing Poland of 
                                                          
3  See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal 
Constitutionalism?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (2018); David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 
521 (2018); András László Pap & Anna Śledzińska-Simon, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy and the 
Remedies of Multi-Level Constitutionalism 1 (The Jean Monnet Center, Working Paper No. 12/17, 2017).  
4  See, e.g., Bojan Bugaric & Tom Ginsburg, The Assault on Postcommunist Courts, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 
69 (2016); Gábor Halmai, An Illiberal Constitutional System in the Middle of Europe, 2014 EURO. Y.B. HUM. 
RTS. 497, 512–13 (2014). 
5  See, e.g., WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN, at ch. 3, 4, 7 (2019); 
Lech Garlicki, Die Ausschaltung des Verfassungsgerichtshofes in Polen? (Disabling the Constitutional Court 
in Poland?), in TRANSFORMATION OF LAW SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL, EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 
IN 1989–2015 63–79 (Andrzej Szmyt & Boguslaw Banaszak eds., 2016); Wojciech Sadurski, Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental 
Enabler, HAGUE J. RULE L.  (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-018-0078-1.  
6  Commission Regulation 2018/103 of Dec. 20, 2017, Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland 2018/103 
complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146, and (EU) 2017/1520, 
2018 O.J. (L 17); Commission Recommendation 2017/1520 of July 26, 2017, Regarding the Rule of Law in 
Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146, 2017 O.J. (L 
228); Commission Regulation 2017/146 of Dec. 21, 2016, Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland 
complementary to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, 2017 O.J. (L 22); Commission 
Recommendation 2016/1374 of July 27, 2016, Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, 2016 O.J. (L 217).  
7   Proposal for Council Decision on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by the 
Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law, COM (2017) 835 final (Dec. 20, 2017); see, e.g., Editorial Comments: 
Safeguarding EU Values in the Member States – Is Something Finally Happening?, 52 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 619, 625–26 (2015); Christophe Hillion, Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU Legal Mandate and 
Means, in REINFORCING RULE OF LAW OVERSIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 59–81 (Carlos Closa & Dimitry 
Kochenov eds., 2016); Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Coups in EU Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
THE RULE OF LAW BRIDGING IDEALISM AND REALISM 446, 468–78 (Maurice Adams, Anne Meuwese & Ernst 
Hirsch Ballin eds., 2017). 
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violating equal treatment of judges of ordinary courts,8 as well as violation of 
the independence of the Supreme Court.9 Hungary is about to face similar 
charges.10  
The relationship between constitutionalism and “illiberal 
democracies”11 or “illiberal changes” is subject to intense academic debate. 
Several concepts have been offered to explain the rule of law crisis: “populist 
constitutionalism,”12 “abusive constitutionalism,”13 a “constitutional coup,”14 
                                                          
8  Case C-192/18, Comm’n v. Republic of Poland, 2018 OJ (C 182). In its action of March 15, 2018, 
the European Commission claimed firstly, that Poland violated the EU provision on equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (2006 O.J. (L 204) 23) and 
secondly, that Poland violated the right to an effective remedy (provided by the Article 47 of the Charter) 
and did not fulfil its treaty obligation to adopt remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the 
fields covered by Union law. According to the Commission’s opinion “by introducing, in . . . Law of 12 July 
2017 amending the Law on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts . . . provisions distinguishing between the 
retirement age for men and women working as ordinary judges, Supreme Court judges, and prosecutors, and 
by lowering, by means of Article 13(1) of that law, the retirement age applicable to ordinary court judges, 
and at the same time granting the Minister of Justice the right to decide whether to extend the period of active 
service of judges pursuant to Article 1(26)(b) and (c) of that law, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil 
its obligations.” 
9  See Case C-619/18, Comm’n v. Republic of Poland (2018). In its action of October 2, 2018, the 
European Commission claimed that Poland violated EU law by lowering the retirement age and applying that 
new retirement age to judges appointed to the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Commission recognised that 
granting the President of the Republic of Poland the discretion to extend the active judicial service of Supreme 
Court judges also violated the basic treaty principles. It is important to note that, according to the 
Commission’s motion, the Vice-President of the Court ordered Poland to immediately suspend the 
application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the lowering of the retirement age for Supreme 
Court judges. Ordonnance De La Vice-Présidente de la Cour 19 Octobre 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:852; see 
also Court of Justice of the European Union press release No 159/18, Luxembourg, October 19, 2018. 
10  On September 12, 2018, by a vote of 448 to 197, the European Parliament recognized a clear risk 
of a serious breach of the EU founding values in Hungary. Therefore, the Parliament decided to activate 
Article 7 TEU and called on the Council of the EU to address recommendations to Hungary to counter the 
threat. The Parliament recalled that Hungary’s accession to the EU “was a voluntary act based on a sovereign 
decision, with a broad consensus across the political spectrum” and underlined that any Hungarian 
government has a duty to eliminate the risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values. Parliament was concerned 
about: the functioning of the constitutional and electoral system; the independence of the judiciary; corruption 
and conflicts of interest; privacy and data protection; and freedom of expression, academic freedom, freedom 
of religion, freedom of association, the right to equal treatment, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
including the Roma and Jews, the fundamental rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and economic 
and social rights. 
11  See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1997). 
12  Paul Blokker, Populist Constitutionalism, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POPULISM 113–
29, 114–18 (Carlos de la Torre ed., 2018). 
13  See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 (2013). 
14  Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions 
Can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to Hungary), 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 51–52 (2014).  
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“democratorship,”15 “bypassing the constitution,”16 “unconstitutional 
capture,”17 and “democratic backsliding.”18 Recently, the situation in Hungary 
and Poland was also described as a “constitutional retrogression,”19 which 
refers to the degradation of the constitutional liberal democracy without its 
complete collapse.20 At the same time, some commentators have indicated that 
we are observing the emergence of a new type of undemocratic regime. 
“Constitutional markers of authoritarianism” was proposed to distinguish the 
authoritarian model from the democratic one.21  
This article aims to fill in the gap in the current debate by demonstrating 
that unconstitutional results, marking an illiberal transformation may be 
achieved by means of a series of statutory amendments outside the 
constitutional amendment procedure, when the guardian of the constitution—
i.e., the Constitutional Tribunal—is deactivated. In other words, the evasion 
of the constitution becomes a means of illiberal change of the legal system. 
We refer to this process as “statutory anti-constitutionalism.”  
The article is structured as follows: The first part of the paper explains 
in more detail the notion of statutory anti-constitutionalism. In the second part, 
entitled “tools of statutory anti-constitutionalism,” the article focuses on the 
legal methods which are used to evade the constitution. First, we analyse an 
excessive use of transitional and intertemporal provisions in the statutes. 
Second, we discuss a statutory practice of shortening vacatio legis  (the period 
between the publication of a legal act and its entry into force) to one day (or 
even the complete lack of it)—a practice that cannot be seen as fulfilment of 
the constitutional aim of vacatio legis, particularly in the context of the 
structural character of changes to the judiciary. Third, we analyse the practice 
under which the constitutionally-determined terms of public institutions are 
                                                          
15  Kim Lane Scheppele, Worst Practices and the Transnational Legal Order (or How to Build a 
Constitutional ‘Democratorship’ in Plain Sight) *4–5 (working paper 2016), archived at 
https://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/events/wright-scheppele2016.pdf. 
16  Mirosław Wyrzykowski, Bypassing the Constitution or Changing the Constitutional Order Outside 
the Constitution, in TRANSFORMATION OF LAW SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL, EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN 
EUROPE IN 1989–2015  159–79 (Andrzej Szmyt & Boguslaw Banaszak eds., 2016).  
17  Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, The Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of 
Institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of Law in Flux, 43 REV. CENTR. & EAST EUR. L. 2, 116–73 (2018). 
18  Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case-Study of Anti-Constitutional 
Populist Backsliding (Jan. 2018) (Unpublished research paper No. 18/01, Sydney Law School), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491.  
19  Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 80, 
94–95 (2018). 
20  Id. at 94. 
21  Gábor Attila Tóth, Constitutional Markers of Authoritarianism, H.J.R.L., 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-018-0081-6.  
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shortened by means of statute. Fourth, we describe how “mirror competences” 
or even “mirror bodies” (i.e., a “person acting as a president of the court”) are 
introduced via statute in order to circumvent the activity of the constitutional 
bodies. At the end of the article, we offer conclusions and underline that the 
Polish experience is a lesson for countries facing the rise of illiberalism. 
Our paper is based on the Polish experience. In the last three years, the 
ruling majority changed the statutes and composition of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, the Supreme Court, the National Judiciary Council, and the common 
courts. Moreover, a new media law, an amendment to the electoral code, a 
new Public Prosecutor’s Office law, and an amendment to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure were introduced. These changes took place even though 
many institutions—including the Venice Commission,22 the European 
Commission,23 the Polish Ombudsman,24 NGOs25 and renowned legal 
scholars26—argued that the new statutes are undemocratic and violate the rule 
                                                          
22  See the opinion on amendments to the act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th plenary session (Venice, 11-12 march 2016), Venice, 11 
march 2016, opinion no. 833/2015, cdl-ad(2016)001; Opinion on the act of 15 January 2016 amending the 
police act and certain other acts adopted by the Venice Commission at its 107th plenary session (Venice, 10-
11 June 2016), Strasbourg, 13 June 2016, opinion no. 839/ 2016, cdl-ad(2016)012; Opinion on the act on the 
public prosecutor’s office as amended adopted by the Venice Commission at its 113th plenary session 
(Venice, 8-9 December 2017), Strasbourg, 11 December 2017, opinion 892 / 2017, cdl-ad (2017) 028; 
Opinion  on the draft act  amending the act on the National Council  of the Judiciary, on the draft act  
amending the act on the Supreme Court,  proposed by the President of Poland,  and on the act  on the 
organisation of ordinary courts adopted by the Venice Commission at its 113th plenary session (8-9 
December 2017), Strasbourg, 11 December 2017, opinion no. 904 / 2017, cdl-ad (2017) 031.  
23  See recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland 2018/103 complementary to Commission 
Opinion 833/2015 of 11 March Recommendations (EU) 2016, On Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 
on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland (L 17/50);/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520, Official 
Journal of the European Union L 17/50; Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk 
of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, COM/2017/0835 final - 2017/0360 (NLE). 
24  See e.g., Adam Bodnar, Europe Can Save Poland from darkness, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-judiciary-rule-of-law-europe-must-intervene/; Adam Bodnar, 
Protection of Human Rights in Poland After the Constitutional Crisis: Domestic and International 
Perspectives, International Perspectives, BRITISH LAW CENTER (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://uw.britishlawcentre.co.uk/dr-adam-bodnar-protection-of-human-rights-in-poland-after-the-
constitutional-crisis/ (video lecture given on Nov. 13, 2017, for the invitation of the BRITISH LAW CENTRE).  
25  See e.g., MAŁGORZATA SZULEKA ET AL. , HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN WARSAW, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN POLAND 2015–2016 (2016), https://www.hfhr.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2016;/09/HFHR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Poland-2015-2016.pdf; Helsinki Foundation 
for Human Rights in Warsaw, Statement on the Draft Acts on the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal 
and the System of Ordinary Courts Adopted by the Parliament, HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Apr. 16, 2018), http://citizensobservatory.pl/wp-content/uploads/of 16 April 
2018/04/hfpc_stanowisko_16042018_EN.pdf. 
26  See THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL SCIENCES, RESOLUTION NO. 1/2015 OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
LEGAL SCIENCES OF THE POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ADOPTED ON 26 NOVEMBER 2015 (Nov. 26, 2015), 
http://www.knp.pan.pl/images/stories/KNP_PAN/KNP_Resolution_ang.pdf. For more information, see also 
the resolutions No 1/2017, 2/2017 and 3/2017 of the Committee for Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy 
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of law. In particular, the reforms of the judiciary were subject to strong 
criticism. This paper covers the period between November 12, 2015 (the 
beginning of the functioning of the Sejm, the representative assembly of the 
Polish Parliament, of the 8th term), and the end of October 2018. 
II. STATUTORY ANTI-CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Normally, changes to the constitutional order are achieved through 
methods detailed in the current constitution or through the adoption of a new 
constitution. However, counterintuitively—an unconstitutional result marking 
an illiberal transformation may also be achieved by means of a series of 
statutory amendments outside the constitutional amendment procedure.27 In 
other words, a change of the constitutional order may be achieved by way of 
                                                          
of Sciences (available only in Polish at official website of the Committee). Also see SADURSKI, supra note 5, 
at ch. 3–7. 
27   In the case of Poland outside the procedure provided in Article 235 of the Polish Constitution: “1. 
According to this provision: ‘1. A bill to amend the Constitution may be submitted by the following: at least 
one-fifth of the statutory number of Deputies; the Senate; or the President of the Republic. 2. Amendments 
to the Constitution shall be made by means of a statute adopted by the Sejm and, thereafter, adopted in the 
same wording by the Senate within a period of 60 days. 3. The first reading of a bill to amend the Constitution 
may take place no sooner than 30 days after the submission of the bill to the Sejm. 4. A bill to amend the 
Constitution shall be adopted by the Sejm by a majority of at least two-thirds of votes in the presence of at 
least half of the statutory number of Deputies, and by the Senate by an absolute majority of votes in the 
presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators. 5. The adoption by the Sejm of a bill amending 
the provisions of Chapters I, II or XII of the Constitution shall take place no sooner than 60 days after the 
first reading of the bill. 6. If a bill to amend the Constitution relates to the provisions of Chapters I, II or XII, 
the subjects specified in para. 1 above may require, within 45 days of the adoption of the bill by the Senate, 
the holding of a confirmatory referendum. Such subjects shall make application in the matter to the Marshal 
of the Sejm, who shall order the holding of a referendum within 60 days of the day of receipt of the 
application. The amendment to the Constitution shall be deemed accepted if the majority of those voting 
express support for such amendment. 7. After conclusion of the procedures specified in paras 4 and 6 above, 
the Marshal of the Sejm shall submit the adopted statute to the President of the Republic for signature. The 
President of the Republic shall sign the statute within 21 days of its submission and order its promulgation 
in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland.” Rozdział XII, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. This 
provision effectively means that in cases when multi-partisan consensus in support of the amendment is 
lacking, the parliamentary ruling majority needs to have at least two-third of seats in the Sejm in order to 
pass the amendment. This is not the case of ruling majority of the Sejm of 8th term. The majority has 235 
out of 460 seats what is well-below the two-third requirement. Note that Polish Constitution does not directly 
contain eternity clause or unchangeable constitutional provisions; see also, Lech Garlicki, Normy 
konstytucyjne relatywnie niezmieniane in CHARAKTER I STRUKTURA NORM KONSTYTUCYJNYCH (Janusz 
Trzciński ed., Warsaw 1997); Wojciech Sokolewicz, 2 KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ. 
KOMENTARZ. 6 (Lech. Garlicki ed., Warsaw 2001). However, the implied constitutional limitations to amend 
the Constitution are increasingly recognized. See Mikołaj Hermann, Sławomira Wronowska, 
PROBLEMATYKA INTERTEMPORALNA W PRAWIE. ZAGADNIENIA PODSTAWOWE. ROZSTRZYGNIĘCIA 
INTERTEMPORALNE. GENEZA, FUNKCJE, AKSJOLOGIA 197 (Jarosław Mikołajewicz ed., Warsaw 2015); 
Mirosław Granat, Rozumienie zmiany Konstytucji RP a tożsamość konstytucyjna, in PROBLEMY ZMIANY 
KONSTYTUCJI 227 (Ryszard Chruściak ed., Warsaw 2017); Ryszard Piotrowski, PREAMBUŁA KONSTYTUCJI 
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ 140–41 (Krzysztof Budziło ed.,Warsaw 2009). See also Judgment of the 
Constitutional Tribunal of 24 November 2010, K 32/09, OTK ZU 2010, series A, No. 9, item 108. 
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statute.28 This process of achieving an unconstitutional result via statute can 
be described as “statutory anti-constitutionalism.” In particular, by means of 
ordinary statutes the ruling majority tries to take control over guardianship of 
the constitutional order (i.e., the Constitutional Tribunal) and the ordinary 
judiciary. Once this is achieved, the government can adopt laws that are 
unconstitutional or act beyond the limits imposed by law, endangering the rule 
of law and fundamental rights.  
A. Stages of Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism 
Three stages of statutory anti-constitutionalism can be distinguished: 
capture of the Constitutional Tribunal (leading to a lack of effective 
centralized constitutional review); erosion of the judiciary (securing 
protection against judicial review); and substantive changes of the legal 
system (securing protection against pluralism and criticism and ensuring the 
irreversibility of changes). All stages are exemplified in the recent Polish 
experience.  
The first stage of statutory anti-constitutionalism in Poland (capture of 
the Constitutional Tribunal) began in December 2015 and was concluded one 
year later. The Parliament: a) invalidated the election of Tribunal judges 
performed during the previous term of Parliament; b) elected “parallel judges” 
to the seats already filled; c) modified the procedural rules before the Tribunal 
(i.e., by changing the number of Judges required to hear a case); d) raised the 
quorum, enabling the Tribunal to act as a plenary body; e) imposed an 
obligation to hear most of the cases in plenary sessions of the Tribunal, and; 
f) empowered the reopening of all proceedings already concluded before the 
Tribunal. During the space of one year, the Constitutional Tribunal statute was 
amended twice and finally replaced by subsequent and completely new 
statutes in July 2016 and in November to December 2016. All these changes 
were aimed at limiting the Tribunal’s activity to prevent efficient and effective 
judicial review, as well as including three persons elected as judges to seats 
already filled by the parliament of the previous term. These acts and statutes 
were recognized as unconstitutional by the Ombudsman, the President of the 
Supreme Court, and members of the opposition.29 Therefore, they were 
questioned before the Tribunal and recognised as unconstitutional in 2015 and 
                                                          
28  See Wyrzykowski, supra note 16, at 159. 
29  See more about arguments on KONSTYTUCYJNY SPÓR O GRANICE ZMIAN ORGANIZACJI I ZASAD 
DZIAŁANIA TRYBUNAŁU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO, CZERWIEC 2015 – MARZEC 2016 29-36, 39, 50-62, 71-112, 132-
135, 150-156, 162-169, 177-187, 201-208, 224-230, 248-257, 269-299426-435 (Piotr Radziewicz, Piotr 
Tuleja eds., Warsaw 2017). 
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2016. Taking into account that the Parliament is bound by the Constitution 
and referring to the principles of separation of powers, the rule of law, and 
independence of judiciary, the Tribunal handed down five important 
judgments on the unconstitutionality of the statutes adopted by the Parliament 
in 2015 and 2016.30 The Tribunal strongly opposed the efforts of the 
parliamentary majority to regulate areas reserved for constitution by means of 
ordinary statutes.31 It also declared that the Parliament shall not have a 
supreme position in the Polish constitutional system and underlined that the 
“supremacy of Nation” principle does not authorize the Parliament to assume 
the powers of other constitutional bodies in the name of the Nation.32 All the 
above-mentioned judgments were adopted without the presence of the 
“parallel judges.”33 As a result, the decisions of the Tribunal were strongly 
criticized by the Members of Parliament and the Government. The Prime 
Minister refused to publish the judgments, and as mentioned above, the Sejm 
adopted new acts on the Tribunal’s status and proceedings by the end of 2016. 
As of June 2018, the Constitutional Tribunal was effectively taken over.34 A 
new President and Vice-President of the Tribunal were chosen.35 The 
government party elected a majority of Judges. Three persons sitting on the 
Tribunal were elected to the vacant seats that had been previously legally 
filled. Accordingly, three of the “old judges”—elected in previous terms of 
Parliament—were removed from their duties by the new President of the 
Tribunal pending the resolution in the case brought by the Minister of Justice, 
who raised procedural violations during their elections.  
The second stage of statutory anti-constitutionalism in Poland started 
in the middle of 2017, when the parliamentary majority passed three new acts 
concerning the judiciary. The first act extended the Minister of Justice’s 
administrative supervision over courts and authorized him to dismiss the 
                                                          
30  Constitutional Tribunal judgments of: Dec. 3, 2015, case No. K 34/15, OTK ZU 2015, No 11, item 
186; Dec. 9, 2015, case No. K 35/15; Mar. 9, 2016, case No. K 47/15, OTK ZU 2016, item 2; Aug. 11, 2016, 
case No. K 39/16, OTK ZU 2016, item 71; Nov. 7, 2016, case No. K 44/16 (unpublished judgment).  
31  K 47/15 of Mar. 9, 2016 of the Constitutional Tribunal; K 39/16 of Aug. 11, 2016 of the 
Constitutional Tribunal; K 44/16 of Nov. 7, 2016 of the Constitutional Tribunal.  
32  K 35/15 of Dec. 9, 2015 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
33  Kp 1/17 of Mar. 16, 2017 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
34  See e.g., Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Living Under the Unconstitutional Capture and Hoping for 
the Constitutional Recapture, VERFASSUNGBLOG (Jan. 3, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/living-under-the-
the-unconstitutional-capture-and-hoping-for-the-constitutional-recapture/.  
35  See generally Marcin Matczak, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS Control Descends into 
Legal Chaos, VERFASSUNGBLOG (Jan. 11, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/polands-constitutional-tribunal-
under-pis-control-descends-into-legal-chaos/).  
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presidents of the common courts.36 The second act provided for the retirement 
of all Supreme Court judges after its entry into force and guaranteed an 
exclusive authority for the Minister of Justice to nominate candidates for new 
judges.37 It also created a new disciplinary proceeding for the Supreme Court 
judges, which gave significant power to the Minister of Justice.38 The third 
statute proclaimed an ipso jure expiration of the National Council of the 
Judiciary members’ mandates and introduced completely new rules for the 
election of new members.39 It also provided the Parliament with the 
competence to elect all members. The acts on the Supreme Court and the 
National Council of the Judiciary were vetoed by the President. The 
presidential proposals for new Supreme Court and the National Council of the 
Judiciary acts were submitted on September 25, 2017,40 and adopted at the 
end of 2017.41 However, these statutes are largely similar in scope to the 
earlier vetoed ones. In particular, they shortened the terms of members of the 
National Council of Judiciary42 and forced Supreme Court judges into early 
retirement.43  
The third stage of statutory anti-constitutionalism in Poland was 
parallel in nature to the second one. The Parliament adopted numerous 
constitutionally controversial laws that allowed the ruling party to both 
monopolize power in state institutions and to restrict fundamental rights. For 
example, new laws or important amendments concerning the Prosecutor's 
Office, Civil Service, Police, public media data retention, and freedom of 
assembly were adopted.44  
The fourth stage, capture of the judiciary, began in the middle of 2018, 
after the Act on the Supreme Court entered into force. The statute lowered the 
                                                          
36  Act of July 12, 2017, amending the Act on Common Courts System and other Acts (Journal of Laws 
2017, item 1452). 
37  Articles 87–89 of the Act on the Supreme Court of 20 July 2017 (subsequently vetoed on July 31, 
2017, by the President of the Republic). 
38  Articles 54 and 57(2) of the Act on the Supreme Court of July 20, 2017. 
39  Article 5(1) of the Act of July 12, 2017, Amending the Act on the National Judiciary Council (vetoed 
on July 31, 2017, by the President of the Republic). 
40  For criticism of the scope of the acts submitted by the President, see Marcin Matczak, President 
Duda is Destroying the Rule of Law Instead of Fixing it, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/president-duda-is-destroying-the-rule-of-law-instead-of-fixing-it/.  
41  Act on the Supreme Court of Dec. 8, 2017 (Journal of Laws 2018, item 5); Act of Dec. 8, 2017 
amending the Act on National Judiciary Council and other acts (Journal of Laws 2018, item 3). 
42  Article 6 of the Act of Dec. 8, 2017 amending the Act on National Judiciary Council and other Acts. 
43  Article 111 of the Act on the Supreme Court of Dec. 8, 2017.  
44  Sadurski, supra note 18, at 4; SADURSKI, supra note 5, at ch. 5–6. 
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retirement age for Supreme Court judges from seventy to sixty-five.45 It was 
directly applicable to acting judges of the court, without leaving them the right 
to decide whether or not to exercise the lower retirement age.46 The new 
provision imposed on acting judges of the Supreme Court who were sixty-five 
or older an obligation to obtain the consent of the President of the Republic to 
exercise their judges’ offices after the statutory provisions entered into force.47 
Moreover, the act created new positions in the Supreme Court by adding two 
new chambers, a Disciplinary Chamber and a Chamber of Extraordinary 
Control and Public Affairs, to the Court’s structure.48  
When the new law entered into force, twenty-seven Supreme Court 
judges were over sixty-five years of age, including the First President of the 
Supreme Court. Eleven of them were retired automatically due to their lack of 
will to serve in the new legal circumstances until the age of seventy. Sixteen 
of the judges over sixty-five declared their will to remain, but they did through 
different legal bases and in different contexts, which led to different legal 
paths and consequences with respect to their decisions. However, the Polish 
Supreme Court judges generally referred to the constitutional provisions 
directly.49 They claimed that the principle of judicial independence and the 
provisions on status of the Supreme Court judges allowed them to serve on 
the Court under the conditions provided by the previously binding law.50 The 
new law was generally recognised as a violation of their constitutional 
guarantees.51 In this context, it is important to note that the First President of 
                                                          
45  Article 37(1) of the Act on the Supreme Court of Dec. 8, 2017. 
46  Article 111 of the Act on the Supreme Court of Dec. 8, 2017. 
47  Id. 
48  Article 27 of the Act on the Supreme Court of Dec. 8, 2017. 
49  Nine judges submitted a declaration in accordance with the new provisions in order to obtain the 
President’s consent for longer service on the Court. They submitted the declarations and opinions on their 
good health conditions in accordance with the new Article 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act. Then the newly 
elected (by the Sejm of the 8th term) members of the National Judiciary Council began their assessment of 
the judges’ declarations in order recommend them for the President of the Republic.  
50  Some of these judges were informed on September 12, 2018 of the status of their retirement by the 
President of the Republic. However, the President did not act either in accordance with the constitutional 
provisions nor with the new statutory provisions on the Supreme Court. It has to be underlined that according 
to the Constitution the President shall adopt a formal decision countersigned by the Prime Minister. Instead, 
the President sent a private letter to the judges. Therefore, the Supreme Court judges declared that they still 
had power to serve as Supreme Court Judges in accordance with both the constitutional provisions as well as 
directly applicable European Union provisions.  
51  In this context it is worth noting the case of Judge Krzysztof Rączka. After the new law on the 
Supreme Court entered into force, on July 12, 2018, Judge Rączka submitted a special declaration due to his 
extraordinary legal situation that was created by the Supreme Court Act. Prima facie the judge was obliged 
to obtain the consent of the President of the Republic in order to continue exercising his judge’s office. 
However, this was legally impossible, as according to the new law such a request should be submitted by a 
judge no later than 6 months and no earlier than 12 months before the date of reaching age 65. In the case of 
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the Supreme Court, Małgorzata Gersdorf, did not submit any declaration and 
did not ask the President for consent to remain at her office. The President of 
the Republic thus sent a letter to President Gersdorf and informed her that she 
was retired ex lege, and, as a consequence, her term as First President of the 
Supreme Court had expired. In her reply on July 19, 2018, President Gersdorf 
asserted that her term was granted directly by a constitutional provision and 
could not be either directly or indirectly shortened by statutory provisions.52 
At the same time, the new National Judiciary Council, elected by the 
Sejm of the 8th term in 2018,53 commenced a procedure to elect new Supreme 
Court judges. During extraordinary sessions at the end of August 2018, 
following quick and short interviews of candidates for the positions of 
Supreme Court judge, the Council recommended forty persons for 
appointment by the President of the Republic. 54 During the next two months, 
the President of the Republic appointed thirty-seven candidates to positions 
as new Supreme Court judges.55 
                                                          
Judge Rączka the period for submitting a request expired on January 28, 2018—before the new law entered 
into force. Therefore, there was no legal basis for such request. The judge submitted a declaration that he is 
still authorized to serve on the Supreme Court regardless of the fact that new law lowered the retirement age 
of Supreme Court Judges. It was based on the directly applicable constitutional provisions of independence 
of the judicial branch and the non-removability of judges. After Judge Rączka made his declaration, the 
Parliament amended the Supreme Court law and adopted a special provision that extended the period for 
submission by a judge of the Supreme Court a request for the consent of the President of the Republic. Having 
regard to the fact that there were no other judges of the Supreme Court to which the new extended period 
pertained, we may call this amendment lex Rączka. It was obviously aimed at forcing Judge Rączka to obtain 
the President’s consent or to leave the Supreme Court (see the Act of July 20, 2018, amending the act on the 
common courts system as well as other laws, Journal of Laws 2018, item 1443). 
52  See Letter from Malgorzata Gersdorf, the First President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Poland, to Andrzej Duda, the President of the Republic of Poland (July 19, 2018), 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SiteAssets/Lists/Wydarzenia/EditForm/2018.07.19%20-
%20List%20PPSN%20do%20Prezydenta%20RP%20-%20EN.pdf. 
53  See, e.g., CHRISTIAN DAVIS, HOSTILE TAKEOVER: HOW LAW AND JUSTICE CAPTURED POLAND’S 
COURTS, FREEDOM HOUSE (May 2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/hostile-takeover-
how-law-and-justice-captured-poland-s-courts.  
54  See Two Lists of Candidates for the Position of Supreme Court Judge, NATIONAL JUDICIARY 
COUNCIL (Aug. 23, 2018), http://www.krs.pl/bip/files/2018-08-23-28/lista%20kandydatow%20powolanych 
%20do%20sadu%20najwyzszego.pdf; See also LIST OF PERSONS IN RELATION TO WHOM THE NATIONAL 
COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY, AT ITS MEETING ON AUGUST 28, 2018, ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS CONTAINING 
MOTIONS FOR APPOINTING THEM TO THE OFFICE OF A JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT, NATIONAL JUDICIARY 
COUNCIL (Aug. 28, 2018), http://krs.pl/bip/files/2018-08-23-28/lista%20do%20bip%20%20gl.%20z% 
2028%20sierpnia.pdf. 
55  See The President Appointed New Judges of the Supreme Court, PREZYDENT.PL (Oct. 10, 2018), 
http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/nominacje/art,96,prezydent-powolal-nowych-sedziow-sadu-
najwyzszego.html; see also The President Handed the Judges’ Appointments, PREZYDENT.PL (Sept. 20, 
2018), http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/nominacje/art,93,prezydent-rp-wreczyl-nominacje-
sedziowskie.html. See also WEBSITE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, 
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However, the judicial branch decided not to stand and idly watch as the 
President and the National Judiciary Council transformed the personnel 
structure of the Supreme Court. First, parts of the Council’s resolutions were 
questioned before the Supreme Administrative Court, which suspended their 
implementation.56 Accordingly, both the National Judiciary Council and the 
President of the Republic must refrain from all actions before the final 
decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in order to avoid further and 
permanent violation of parties’ rights. In particular, the President must wait 
with the appointments. Secondly, the Supreme Court, sitting in a panel of “old 
judges,” submitted five preliminary questions57 to the Court of Justice of 
European Union58 regarding the 2017-2018 judiciary reforms and changes 
contained in the Supreme Court Act.59  
In addition, several ordinary courts in Poland submitted preliminary 
questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Court was asked 
whether the new model of disciplinary proceedings for judges, wherein a 
                                                          
http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/nominacje/art,96,prezydent-powolal-nowych-sedziow-sadu-
najwyzszego.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).  
56  II GW 22/18 of Sept. 25, 2018, of the Supreme Administrative Court; II GW 23/18 of Sept. 27, 
2018, of the Supreme Administrative Court; II GW 31/18 of Oct. 8, 2018, of the Supreme Administrative 
Court. 
57  III PO 6/18 of Aug.1, 2018 of the Supreme Court; III UZP 4/18 of Aug. 2, 2018 of the Supreme 
Court; III PO 7/18 of Aug. 30 2018 of the Supreme Court; III PO 8/18 of Sept. 19, 2018 of the Supreme 
Court; III PO9/18 of Sept. 19, 2018 of the Supreme Court; II PK 153/17 of Oct. 3, 2018 of the Supreme 
Court. 
58  See Case C-537/18, Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa, 2018 E.C.R.; see also Case C‑522/18, Zaklad 
Ubezpieczen Spolecznych, 2018 E.C.R.; see also Case C-585/18, Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa, 2018 E.C.R. 
59  In all these mentioned cases, the Supreme Court referred to the Polish statutory provisions on the 
Supreme Court and asked the Court of Justice whether EU primary law allowed for the adoption of national 
legislation on lowering the retirement age of judges of a court of last instance age from 70 to 65, a provision 
that is applicable to acting judges of that court, without leaving them the right to decide whether or not to 
exercise a lower retirement age. The Supreme Court asked whether a national provision that imposed an 
obligation on acting judges of the Supreme Court 65 years old or older to obtain the consent of the President 
of the Republic for exercising their judges’ offices after the statutory provisions entered into force are 
consistent with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter. The Supreme Court also asked whether the 
situation created by aforementioned statutory provisions might be classified as discrimination on the grounds 
of age, prohibited by EU secondary law. Moreover, in the event of a finding of discrimination and violation 
of EU law by the national statutory provisions, the European Court of Justice was asked whether the Supreme 
Court may decline to apply that national legislation on lowering the retirement age of judges and sit in a panel 
with the discriminated judges in order to provide effective judicial protection of EU law. The Supreme Court 
also asked whether, acting as a European court, it has the power to suspend the application of all national 
provisions that violate guarantees of the tenure of judges in all cases of Supreme Court judges affected by 
the new law on lowering the retirement age of judges. The Supreme Court suggested that the newly adopted 
Polish statutory provisions may violate: the treaty obligation of the Member State to provide sufficient and 
effective judicial protection in the fields covered by Union law; the principle of sincere cooperation in the 
context of the rule of law guaranties; the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial; as well as the non-
discrimination rules expressed in Directive 2000/78, art. 13, 2000 O.J. (L303) 21 (EC).  
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significant role is provided for the Minister of Justice and which does not 
provide any guaranties of objectivity and independence for disciplinary 
courts, is consistent with E.U. standards.60 
B. The “Nations’ Will” Argument and Legal Formalism 
Statutory anti-constitutionalism is based on the populist usage of the 
“Nations’ will” argument. For example, in late 2015, several members of the 
Polish Parliament61 and participants in public debates referred to the theory of 
the supremacy of the parliament over other constitutional bodies. Their 
justifications were based directly on the concept of the Nation’s will.62 A 
similar justification was given in 2017 by the group of experts appointed by 
the Speaker of the Sejm who were working on the report in response to the 
                                                          
60  See Case C-563/18, Prokuratura Okregowa w Plocku, 2018 E.C.R.; see also Case C-558/18, Miasto 
Lowicz, 2018 E.C.R. 
61  See, inter alia, Kornel Morawiecki, posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu, in 2 
SPRAWOZDANIE STENOGRAFICZNE 78 (Nov. 25, 2015); MAREK AST, posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, in 3 SPRAWOZDANIE STENOGRAFICZNE 14–15 (Dec. 2, 2015). 
62   It should be emphasized that such a concept has no constitutional basis in Poland. According to 
well-established interpretations of constitutional provisions, the Nations’ will cannot justify the supremacy 
of the legislative power over the Constitution or other branches of power. In a case concerning the 
constitutionality of the provisions regulating the election of justices of the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
Tribunal pointed out that “[t]he obligation to observe the Constitution is particularly important with regard 
to persons in power. This is manifested, inter alia, by the oath of office that must be taken before assuming 
the office by Sejm Deputies, Senators, the President, members of the Council of Ministers, as well as other 
officials. What safeguards the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, and ultimately also the rights 
and freedoms of the individual, is, inter alia. the judicial review of the constitutionality of norms, conducted 
by an independent authority which is separate from the legislature and the executive. Since their origins, 
constitutional courts in European legal culture have been conceived of as ‘safeguards for individuals against 
the tyranny of a majority’ and guarantors of the precedence of law over power. After the experience of 
totalitarian regimes, there is no doubt that even a democratically-elected parliament has no competence to 
issue determinations that would be contrary to the Constitution, even if they were justified by ‘the good of 
the Nation’, where the term is understood in an abstract way. Thus, the constitution-maker has delineated 
substantive and procedural limits for public authorities, within which all their determinations must fall in 
every case.” (K 34/15 of December 3, 2015 of The Constitutional Tribunal). The Tribunal also underlined 
that, it “is not only the guarantor of the supremacy of the Constitution, but it also safeguards the tri-partite 
division of powers. Any regulations concerning the Tribunal may not lead to a situation where it would lose 
its capacity to carry out its activity.” (K 34/15 of December 9, 2015 of the Constitutional Tribunal). For the 
Tribunal there was no doubt that one of the most important aims of the Articles 8 and 10 of the Constitution 
is to protect against the concentration of powers and competences in one office. Referring to the previous 
case-law, the Tribunal stated that the Parliament should not have a supreme position in the Polish 
constitutional system, and highlighted that the supremacy of nation principle, Article 4 Rozdział I, 
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. did not authorize the Parliament to assume other constitutional 
bodies’ competences in the name of the nation (U 4/06 of Sept. 22, 2006, of The Constitutional Tribunal). 
Article 4 of the Constitution means, in particular, a prohibition against the legislative, as well as the executive 
or judiciary, replacing or opposing the Constitution (enacted in accordance with a special procedure by the 
National Assembly and approved in a referendum by the Nation), or acting in in the name of the nation in 
breach of the constitutional law. 
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Venice Commission’s opinion on the constitutional crisis in Poland.63 As it 
was later observed:  
This novel vision of the Polish constitutional law emphasized the 
supremacy of democracy over the abstract principle of rule of 
law; the concept of separation of powers based the supremacy of 
Parliament; and the need to weaken the position of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal and prevent the expansion of 
“juristocracy” and the “judicialization of politics.”64  
An important feature of statutory anti-constitutionalism is an almost 
obsessive attention to legalism in the narrow (formal) sense,65 which makes 
the formal conformity of the legislative process probably the most important 
value. It may be recognized as the main source of legitimation, since the 
parliament is claimed to have the last word in a constitutional interpretation. 
In this context, the internal procedural rules of the parliament play a primary 
role and may be changed according to the needs of the parliamentary majority.  
The special role of formal legalism is also visible in the scope of 
statutes. It has become normal for the parliament to create a direct legal basis 
for the government or other authorities to act in an unconstitutional way. In 
other words, in the event of a substantive nonconformity with constitutional 
provisions, there are always statutory provisions that allow an authority to act 
and declare publicly that such act shall be deemed legal. For example, the 
Sejm adopted twice the statutory provisions that allowed the President of the 
Republic not to appoint judges legally elected by the previous parliament.66 A 
                                                          
63  ARKADIUSZ ADAMCZYK ET AL., EXPERT REPORT ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRIBUNAL (2016).   
64  Anna Śledzińska-Simon & Michał Ziółkowski, Constitutional Identity of Poland: Is the Emperor 
Putting on the Old Clothes of Sovereignty? 14–15 (July 5, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2997407).   
65  There is no question that the rule of law principle has various meanings and interpretations 
depending on the constitutional subject, tradition, history, or legal culture. From either a pluralistic 
constitutional position or a comparative one it may be hard to find one answer to the question of the 
substantive relationship between democracy and the rule of law. It should, however, be underlined that the 
distinction between the procedural rule of law concept and the substantive one has been widely accepted. 
The first (narrow) rule of law definition emphasizes the procedural framework for public authorities’ 
decisions only, while the (wide) substantive theory goes beyond this and looks for the underlying fairness, 
justice or equality components under the rule of law. The principle of judicial independence is also included 
by scholars in the latter-mentioned scope. 
66  See Article 90 of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of July 22, 2016; Article 1(1) of the Act of 
Nov. 19, 2015, amending the Act of the Constitutional Tribunal of June 25, 2015; see also consequences of 
Article 18(2) and Article 21(2) of the statute of Dec. 13, 2016 – Provisions on introduction of the Act on the 
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similar situation can be observed in the case of the statute shortening the terms 
of constitutional authorities,67 despite the fact that there are well-established 
constitutional prohibitions against such a practice.  
Under statutory anti-constitutionalism, it is a common practice for 
members of parliament or government to refer to the constitutional principle 
of legalism in order to draw attention away from the substantive 
unconstitutionality of their statutes. At the same time, they underscore the 
general and vague nature of the constitutional provisions in issue and their 
openness to interpretation—an interpretation made in the end by the 
parliament as the voice of the Nation’s will. In the end, this leads to a 
phenomenon that had been recently described as a “constitution-hostile 
interpretation.” According to Jerzy Zajadło:  
[A c]onstitution-hostile interpretation is a political strategy 
accompanied by a specific perverse political rhetoric of a quite 
primitive, populist character. The authors of this strategy usually 
demonstrate the will or even acknowledge the obligation to 
observe the constitution, but at the same time they call the 
constitution “internally contradictory and conflictogenic,” 
“postcommunist,” “a constitution for the elites, not for ordinary 
people,” etc. . . . [T]he phenomenon of interpretatio 
constitutionis hostilis is an example of extreme 
instrumentalization of the process of interpretation for the needs 
of current politics, ergo an example of recognizing the primacy 
of politics over law, even at the level of the basic law. . . . In the 
case of a constitution-hostile interpretation . . .  the aim is mostly 
to forcibly include in the legal system even those normative 
solutions which are clearly unconstitutional, but which the 
authors wish to become the valid law. . . . Interpretatio 
constitutionis hostilis does not recognize any commonly 
accepted paradigms of jurisprudence; it creates its own, new 
paradigms which nobody knew before.68 
                                                          
Organization and Proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal and the Judges of the Constitutional 
Tribunal Status Act (Journal of Laws 2016, item 2074). 
67  See, e.g., Article 6 of the Act of Dec. 8, 2017, amending the Act on National Judiciary Council and 
other acts; Articles 111 and 111(a) of the Act on the Supreme Court of Dec. 8, 2017. 
68  Jerzy Zajadło, Constitution-Hostile Interpretation, 2 PRZEGLĄD KONSTYTUCYJNY 5, 8–13 (2018).   
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C. Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism and Other Existing Concepts 
Statutory anti-constitutionalism may be distinguished from other 
existing concepts. It is different from the idea of “abusive 
constitutionalism,”69 which according to David Landau refers to the “use of 
mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order.”70 In 
statutory anti-constitutionalism, a new constitutional amendment procedure is 
not introduced, nor are new constitutions or constitutional amendments 
enacted. The winner of an election does not have sufficient public support or 
enough seats in the parliament to change constitutional provisions.  
Statutory anti-constitutionalism needs to also be distinguished from 
“higher law-making.”71 According to Ackerman, the higher law-making 
process  consists of several phases: “signaling” (when representatives get 
extraordinary support for their initiative for revision of the higher law in the 
country)72; a “proposal” (when a popular movement translates into calls for a 
revision in an operational proposal)73; “mobilized deliberation” (consisting of 
the following sub-phases: “constitutional impasse,” “decisive electoral 
mandate,” “unconventional assault,” “switch in time,” and a “consolidating 
election”)74; and “legal codification” (when the Supreme Court translates the 
constitutional reform into constitutional doctrine).75 In the case of rapid 
evasion of the constitution via statute, there are no “signaling,” “proposal,” or 
“mobilized deliberation” phases. All legal changes are invented by politicians 
without specific public support for even public deliberations. They are applied 
as soon as possible from on high by the parliamentary majority and quickly 
sanctioned by the government. The phenomenon is also different from the 
concept of “dualist democracy.”76 There is no popular movement for 
constitutional change. Actors in the process of statutory anti-constitutionalism 
are limited to the central constitutional authorities only (Parliament, the 
President, or Government).77  
                                                          
69  David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47, U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 189 (2013). 
70  Id.  
71   BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 1: FOUNDATIONS 272 (1993). 
72  Id.   
73  Id. at 280.  
74  Id. at 285.  
75  Id. at 288.   
76  Id. at 3.  
77  See also, Michał Ziółkowski, Constitutional Moment and the Polish Constitutional Crisis 2015–
2018 (a few Critical Remarks), 4 PRZEGLĄD KONSTYTUCYJNY 86 (2018). 
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The evasion of the constitution by means of statute may sometimes be 
linked to a radical version of “political constitutionalism,” which is usually 
confronted with “legal constitutionalism” (based on institutional legitimacy, 
the primacy of law over politics, and the recognition and protection of human 
rights).78 For instance, such an interpretation of the Polish experience was 
given by Adam Czarnota, who suggested that: 
Legal constitutionalism which leads to the judicialisation of 
politics is criticised by political constitutionalism, which is based 
on the position that the constitution only provides the framework 
for democratic disagreement and framework itself can be an 
object of re-negotiation. Political constitutionalism stresses the 
greater legitimacy of parliaments as opposed to constitutional 
tribunals in law making. Constitutional review is based on a zero-
sum game principle. Political constitutionalism presents 
parliament as a place of dialogue. The concept of political 
constitutionalism criticises legal constitutionalism for its 
monopolisation of the constitution, which belongs to the whole 
nation and which citizens should have the opportunity to 
interpret and use in their everyday activities. Democratic 
political constitutionalism suggests that it is necessary to rethink 
the ontological basis of legal constitutionalism. The constitution 
is not an act but a never-ending dialogue and postulates a greater 
participation of citizens. . . . I interpret the present constitutional 
crisis in Poland and some other countries in Central-Eastern 
Europe as an attempt to take the constitution seriously and return 
it to the citizens.79 
           However, considering the republican virtues and origins of R. 
Bellamy’s “political constitutionalism” concept and the link to the theory of a 
democratic state, we are of the opinion that statutory anti-constitutionalism 
differs from the idea of political constitutionalism. In statutory anti-
constitutionalism, there is no process of broad deliberation or citizen 
involvement. Paul Blokker underlines that: 
[A] key dimension of political constitutionalism is the 
observation that specific constitutional norms and rights are 
                                                          
78  See also RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 145 (2007) (discussing political constitutionalism). 
79  Aadam Czarnota, The Constitutional Tribunal, VERFASSUNGBLOG (June 3, 2017),  
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-constitutional-tribunal/.   
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ultimately “essentially contestable,” as reasonable disagreement 
is an intrinsic part of democracy. Therefore, the understanding 
and interpretation of such norms and rights ought to remain part 
of an on-going political debate, rather than being one-sidedly 
interpreted by the judiciary. Such an open and inclusionary 
political debate ought to take place within the limits of the 
constitution as a basic framework for resolving disagreements.80 
The concept of statutory anti-constitutionalism fits into the growing 
populism literature, where populism is associated with the confrontational 
approach to institutions of liberal democracies and the negation of 
constitutional or liberal democracy.81 Indeed, statutory anti-constitutionalism 
may be seen as one of the methods used by populists to introduce changes by 
bypassing the classic constitutional legal framework and institutions of liberal 
democracy82—such as courts83—and by doing so allegedly in response to the 
popular will of the majority.84 According to Paul Blokker:  
The populist understanding of constitutionalism hinges on the 
revolutionary tradition, but with a specific twist. Populism 
captures the popular will and claims it its own, against other 
social forces, in or outside of society. Populists tend to define the 
people in strong contrast to significant Others (elites, non-
natives, foreign forces), and by doing so turn their (idealized) 
                                                          
80  Paul Blokker, From Legal to Political Constitutionalism?, VERFASSUNGBLOG (June 4, 2017), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/from-legal-to-political-constitutionalism/.  
81  See Paul Blokker, Populist Constitutionalism, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POPULISM, 
(Carlos de la Torre ed., 2019) (Underlines that populists do not reject democracy as such, but they play on 
edges of the “constitutional” aspect of democracy; they claim to be defending a pure form of rule by the 
people, while having difficulties with the first ingredient, constitutionalism.); see also Marc Santora & Helen 
Bienvenu, Secure in Hungary, Orban Readies for Battle with Brussels, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/europe/hungary-victor-orban-immigration-europe.html 
(discussing specific and particular rejection of liberal democracy from the speech of V. Orban, the prime 
minister of Hungary, who in inaugurating his third term in office in May 2018 observed that: “We need to 
say it out loud because you can't reform a nation in secrecy: ‘The era of liberal democracy is over,’ and then 
added ‘Rather than try to fix a liberal democracy that has run aground, we will build a 21st-century Christian 
democracy.”). See also Maciej Bernatt, Illiberal Populism: Competition Law at Risk? (Jan. 24, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321719. 
82  Populists tend to reject procedures of liberal democracy and to contest them as being cumbersome 
and artificial, placing constraints on the true political will of the people. 
83  See Zoltán Fleck, Judges under Attack in Hungary, VERFASSUNGBLOG (May 14, 2018), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/judges-under-attack-in-hungary (stating populists often consider courts and 
judges as their opponents). 
84  JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 68 (2016); NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY 
DISFIGURED 129 (2014). 
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construction of the people into the only acceptable, non-
corrupted one. The people are in this way equated with a self-
constructed populist majority, understood in contrast to 
minorities. The rule of law and constitutionalism cannot, 
according to populists, override the “real” popular will. 
Constitutionalism as such becomes a device in the populist 
project of rebuilding the state.85 
Thus, the statutory anti-constitutionalism has more in common with the 
concept of populist constitutionalism than political constitutionalism per se. 
III. THE TOOLS OF STATUTORY ANTI-CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Various legal methods may be used to evade the constitution through 
statute. Their closer study helps understand the ways in which systemic 
unconstitutional transformation may be achieved without changing the 
constitution. 
A. The “Parallel” Public Institutions 
One distinctive feature of statutory anti-constitutionalism in Poland is 
the creation of “parallel” institutions and public bodies by the Sejm of the 8th 
term. By trying to act legally in the formal sense, the Sejm could neither 
directly dismiss the members of public authorities before the end of their terms 
nor dissolve institutions explicitly named and protected under the 
constitutional provisions, including the President of the Tribunal and the 
National Judiciary Council. In order to avoid such a clear violation of the 
Constitution, while assuming that constitutional provisions do not directly 
limit legislative power, the Sejm decided to create new public authorities with 
similar or competing competences to those in existence. 
As a consequence, from 2015 to 2018, the parliamentary majority 
invented and introduced equivalents of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal, National Broadcasting Council, 
and President of the Supreme Court. All these “parallel” authorities received 
specific powers and tasks in order to implement or maintain the reforms 
adopted by the Sejm of the 8th term. The election of “parallel” judges was 
aimed at blocking the appointment of three judges duly elected by the Sejm 
                                                          
85  Paul Blokker, Populist Constitutionalism, VERFASSUNGBLOG (May 4, 2017), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/populist-constitutionalism. 
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of the previous term. Moreover, they were expected to counterbalance the 
“old” members of the Constitutional Tribunal and to restrain judges from 
ruling on the (un)constitutionality of the new reforms. A “parallel” Vice-
President of the Tribunal was responsible for organization of the election of 
the new President of the Tribunal and implementing the reforms in the 
organization of the Tribunal. The “parallel” National Broadcasting Council 
became responsible for reform of the public media. The “parallel” President 
of the Supreme Court was originally thought to lead the court during the 
reform of the judiciary, instead of the court’s acting First President. 
Regardless of the different and specified singular statutory tasks, the 
“parallel” institutions have a common aim. On one hand, they are aimed at 
undermining the legitimacy of the “old” institutions or public authorities that 
had been elected before. On the other hand, they help justify further reforms.  
1. “Parallel Judges” of the Tribunal 
The best example of such parallel institutions is the election by the Sejm 
of the 8th term of three persons to seats on the Constitutional Tribunal; seats 
which had been already filled by the judges duly elected by the Sejm of the 
7th term. In other words, the Sejm of the 8th term created three “parallel 
judges” in the Constitutional Tribunal, sometimes dubbed by Polish scholars 
as “fake judges,”86 “duplicate judges,”87 or “anti-judges.”88 The acts of the 
Sejm were unconstitutional because at the beginning of the 8th term of 
parliament there were fifteen judges legally elected to the Constitutional 
Tribunal.89 Twelve of them had been elected by the Sejm of the 5th term (three 
                                                          
86  Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Living under the unconstitutional capture and hoping for the 
constitutional recapture, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/living-under-the-
the-unconstitutional-capture-and-hoping-for-the-constitutional-recapture.   
87  Sadurski, supra note 18, at 21. 
88  Marcin Matczak, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal under PiS control descends into legal chaos, 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/polands-constitutional-tribunal-under-pis-
control-descends-into-legal-chaos/.  
89  The Constitution of Poland contains wide regulation of the Constitutional Tribunal’s status, powers, 
and composition. According to the Article 194: “1. The Constitutional Tribunal shall be composed of 15 
judges chosen individually by the Sejm for a term of office of 9 years from amongst persons distinguished 
by their knowledge of the law. No person may be chosen for more than one term of office. 2. The President 
and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from 
amongst candidates proposed by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.” 
Rozdział VIII, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Constitutional provisions also guarantee: a) Judges’ 
independence and the Tribunal’s separation from other branches of power, id. at art. 195; b) the Tribunal’s 
competence to control different normative, id. at art. 188; c) the Parliament’s competence to establish the 
Tribunal’s organization and rules of procedure in a specific statute, id. at art. 197. It is worth noticing that 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal Judges shall be subject only to the Constitution, id. at art. 195, which may be 
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judges), 6th term (eight judges), and 7th term (one judge), and all were 
appointed by the President of the Republic. Three other judges, legally elected 
in October 2015 by the Sejm of the 7th term, were waiting to be sworn in 
before the President. Therefore, there were no vacancies in the Constitutional 
Tribunal, and the Sejm of the 8th term had no power to act.  
In order to offer a sufficient explanation for the above situation90 and 
the concept of “parallel judges,” we have to go back to June 2015, when a new 
statute on the Constitutional Tribunal was adopted by the Sejm of the 7th 
term.91 The original draft law was submitted in 2013 by the President of the 
Republic. Its aim was to fine-tune existing law, in particular when it comes to 
procedural provisions.92 The draft was based on well-developed constitutional 
case-law. Therefore, its provisions were not controversial. However, at the 
end of a legislative proceeding, an infamous Article 137 was added to the 
statute and the story of “parallel judges” began. According to that provision, 
the Sejm of the 7th term was given an extraordinary power to elect the 
Constitutional Tribunal judges for all vacancies in 2015. Taking into account 
the constitutional judges’ calendar of terms, the Sejm of the 7th term reserved 
the right to elect judges for three vacancies, one of which was to arise on the 
7th of November and two on the 2nd and 8th of December 2015. From a 
constitutional point of view, there would have been nothing controversial 
about such a regulation, if it had been applied to judges’ vacancies opened 
before the end of the Sejm of the 7th term. However, 2015 was a parliamentary 
election year in Poland and during the adoption of Article 137, there was a 
high probability that two judges of the Constitutional Tribunal would be 
elected by Sejm of the next term.93 Therefore, the real aim of Article 137 was 
to have five judges elected by the Sejm of the 7th term instead of three.94 
                                                          
directly applied by the Tribunal and other courts, id. at art. 8, Rozdział I). According to the Constitution, the 
Tribunal judgments shall be universally binding, final, and immediately published in the Journal of Laws, id. 
at art. 190, Rozdział VIII. 
90  See Małgorzata Szuleka, Marcin Szwed, & Marcin Wolny, The Constitutional Crisis In Poland 
2015–2016, HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (April 2016), http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/HFHR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Poland-2015-2016.pdf.  
91  Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of July 22, 2015 (Journal of Laws 2015, item 1064).  
92  Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of Aug. 1, 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, No. 102, item 643).  
93  In conformity with the constitutional regulation, on July 17, 2015, the President had ordered the 
general election, which took place on October 23, 2015. The first session of the newly elected Sejm was on 
November 12, 2015. See art. 98, Rozdział IV, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
94  See Anna Chmielarz-Grochal & Jarosław Sułkowski, Appointment of Judges to the Constitutional 
Tribunal in 2015 as the Trigger Point for a Deep Constitutional Crisis in Poland, 2 PRZEGLĄD 
KONSTYTUCYJNY 93–99 (2018), http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/PKonst_2_2018_91-119.pdf. It should be noted that this aim was clearly worded 
during the parliamentary discussion. 
 
508 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 2 
 
 
October 8, 2015, was the first time in Polish constitutional history when the 
constitutional provisions governing the election of the Constitutional 
Tribunal’s judges were violated by the Sejm. The election of five judges by 
the Sejm of the 7th term was questioned by the opposition party (PiS—Law 
and Justice) before the Constitutional Tribunal in October 2015. However, 
after winning the general election the party withdrew its application to the 
Constitutional Tribunal and began working on amendment of the 
Constitutional Tribunal Act of 2015. Therefore, there was no basis for the 
Tribunal to adjudicate this case.95 At the same time, members of the new 
opposition (PO—Civic Platform and PSL—Polish People’s Party96) 
submitted a new application to the Constitutional Tribunal and argued, inter 
alia, that the Sejm of the 7th term violated the Constitution by the election of 
two judges for Tribunal vacancies opened during the Sejm of the 8th term.  
The case, No. K 34/15, was heard by the Tribunal on December 3, 2015, 
with the significant and intentional absence of the Sejm’s representative and 
in an atmosphere of political pressure put on the Tribunal judges.97 On the 
same day, the Tribunal delivered its final judgment on the partial 
unconstitutionality of Article 137.98 The reasoning was based on three 
constitutional arguments and one empirical one.99 Firstly, according to the 
wording and rationale of Article 194(1) of the Constitution, the Sejm is the 
only authority constitutionally empowered to elect the Tribunal judges. 
Therefore, a person specified in an appropriate Sejm resolution shall be 
recognized as a judge. Once chosen for a Tribunal judge seat, such person 
cannot be dismissed by the Sejm, which has no constitutional power to 
invalidate a judge’s election. Secondly, while the President of the Republic’s 
decision on the appointment of the Constitutional Tribunal judges, as required 
by constitutional provisions, has an important legal and ceremonial character. 
This does not mean, however, that such a decision is constitutive in effect. 
Following the election by the Sejm, the person that stands and swears in before 
the President of the Republic is a judge. Third, according to the interpretation 
of the constitutional provisions the Sejm may elect Tribunal judges for a 
vacancy open before the end of a parliamentary term. It is unconstitutional to 
elect judges in advance (i.e., as was done in 2015). The descriptive argument 
                                                          
95  See K 35/15 of Dec. 9, 2015 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
96  Both were governmental parties before the 2015 election and responsible for the adoption of the 
infamous Article 137 of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of July 22, 2015.  
97  See Mirosław Wyrzykowski, Antigone in Warsaw, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD. 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR LESZEK GARLICKI 372–75 (Marek Zubik ed., 2017).  
98  K 35/15 of Dec. 9, 2015 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
99  See Chmielarz-Grochal & Sułkowski, supra note 94, at 103–07. 
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given by the Tribunal was that the Sejm of the 7th term could elect only three 
judges considering the election calendar in 2015. With regard to the fact that 
two vacancies opened after the general election in December 2015, the Sejm 
of the 8th term had the power to elect two judges.  
From the constitutional point of view, the above-mentioned judgment 
confirmed the power of the Sejm of the 7th term to elect only three judges and 
invalidated the legal basis for the election of the two additional judges which 
took place in October 2015.100 Therefore, the Tribunal confirmed the 
competence of the Sejm of the 8th term to elect two judges in December 
2015.101 This was the only possible legal solution to restore constitutionality 
following the violation of the constitutional provisions by the Sejm of the 7th 
term.  
Unfortunately, the parliamentary ruling majority decided not to wait for 
the Tribunal’s judgment.102 During a night session on December 2, 2015, the 
Sejm voted to invalidate the election by the Sejm of the 7th term of all five 
judges, and then elected five persons.103 Three of them were elected for the 
seats already filled by the judges legally elected by the Sejm of the 7th term. 
Two persons were elected for the vacancies that opened on the 2nd and 8th of 
December 2015. All mentioned persons had been appointed by the President 
of the Republic early in the morning on the day the Tribunal started to hear 
case No. K 34/15. Thus, the constitutional provisions had been violated again 
by the Sejm. However, this time the violation had a different substance and 
different consequences, and it was made by both the Sejm of the 8th term and 
the President of the Republic.104 Firstly, the Sejm of the 8th term had no power 
to elect three persons due to the lack of vacancies on the Tribunal. On 
December 2, 2015, the Tribunal consisted of fifteen judges (the maximum 
allowed by the constitutional rule). Secondly, the President had no power to 
appoint three persons elected by the Sejm of the 8th term, because three judges 
legally elected in October 2015 were waiting (indefinitely) to be sworn in by 
the President.  
                                                          
100  See Anna Śledzińska-Simon, Midnight Judges: Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal Caught Between 
Political Fronts, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 23, 2015), https://verfassungsblog.de/midnight-judges-polands-
constitutional-tribunal-caught-between-political-fronts/. 
101  K 34/15 of Dec. 3, 2015 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
102  See Ewa Łętowska & Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska, A ‘Good’ Change in the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal?, 1 OSTEUROPA RECHT 79 (2016). 
103  See Anna Śledzińska-Simon, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal under Siege, VERFASSUNGSBLOG 
(Dec. 4, 2015), https://verfassungsblog.de/polands-constitutional-tribunal-under-siege.  
104  See Chmielarz-Grochal & Sułkowski, supra note 94, at 107–14. 
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The decision of the Sejm of the 8th term to invalidate the election of 
three judges by the Sejm of the 7th term and then to elect “parallel judges,” as 
well as the decision of the President of the Republic to swear-in the “parallel 
judges” violated the constitutional principle of judicial independence and 
Article 194(1) of the Constitution. First, under both constitutional regulation 
and well-established custom, each judge is elected for an individual nine-year 
term, which implies the election of a new judge shall be held just before the 
end of the term of the outgoing judge.105 The Sejm has the competence to elect 
judges only for a vacant position on the Tribunal. Second, under the Polish 
constitutional system, there is neither a direct nor indirect legal basis for the 
invalidation of the election of previous judges. To do this, the Sejm used a 
proceeding that had been designed for political resolutions with no legal 
effect.106 Therefore such a resolution could not “re-open” the Constitutional 
Tribunal judges’ elections that had been carried out during the previous 
parliamentary term. Otherwise there would be no legal certainty and it would 
always be possible to change the decisions of previous parliaments. Third, the 
Tribunal, as well as other constitutional authorities, were faced with a fait 
accompli by the Sejm of the 8th term. One year following their election, the 
“parallel judges” were included into the composition of the Tribunal and 
allowed to adjudicate.107 During this period the Sejm of the 8th term elected 
four more judges (this time in conformity with the calendar of Tribunal 
vacancies). This means that as of the middle of 2018 nine members of the 
Tribunal were elected by the same parliamentary majority. Before the end of 
the Sejm’s 8th term, the same majority will be able to elect one more judge, 
which means that two-thirds of the Tribunal members will be elected during 
the 8th term of the parliament. Under such circumstances, the idea of 
pluralism of the Tribunal members and the mechanism of election of 
individual judges by Sejms of different terms, introduced into the Constitution 
in 1997, is becoming illusory.  
The “parallel judges” have played an important role in the newly 
composed Constitutional Tribunal. First, they blocked the nine “old judges” 
from designating candidates from among themselves for the positions of the 
                                                          
105  See generally Andrzej Mączyński & Jan Podkowik, in KONSTYTUCJA RP. TOM II. KOMENTARZ DO 
ART. 87–243 1280–82, (Marek Safjan & Leszek Bosek eds., 2016). 
106  See U 8/15 of Jan. 7, 2016 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
107  See Article 18(2), Act of Dec. 13, 2016 – Provisions on Introduction of the Act on the Organization 
and Proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal and the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal Status Act. 
See also id. at art. 21(2). 
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President and Vice-President of the Tribunal.108 Second, the “parallel judges” 
supported Julia Przyłębska (elected by the Sejm of the 8th term) to become 
the President of the Tribunal.109 Third, the “parallel judges,” supported by 
other persons elected by the Sejm of the 8th term, designated from among 
themselves the candidate for the Vice-President of the Tribunal.110 Fourth, the 
“parallel judges” have been members of the Tribunal’s panel in the vast 
majority of cases, which seems to be of particular importance to the 
governmental party.111 Fifth, one of the “parallel judges” publicly supported 
the governmental majority and its political reforms,112 which had been 
                                                          
108  See Protocol of the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, Dec. 20, 2016.   
109  See id. 
110  See Protocol of the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, July 5, 2017.  
111  A good example of their influence may be the Constitutional Tribunal judgment of March 16, 2017. 
Kp 1/17 of Mar. 16, 2017, of the Constitutional Tribunal. In this case, the applicant raised the argument that 
the constitutional principle of freedom of assembly had been violated by the statutory preference for a new 
type of public assemblies—called assemblies of a cyclical nature. “It should be emphasized that this kind of 
assembly has not been recognized so far in the Polish legal order. The new regulation also excluded the 
constitutional right to appeal a decision by public authorities prohibiting a public assembly.” Sadurski, supra 
note 18, at 33. According to the questioned law, an assembly may be recognized as a cyclical in its nature 
when: a) has the same organizer, tour, and takes place at least four times a year; b) has its own history (i.e., 
took place for three years before it was reported); and c) is aimed to celebrate events of high importance in 
Polish history. One of the consequences of awarding an assembly a cyclical status is its privileged position, 
including an exclusive right to take place before other assemblies. The unconstitutionally composed Tribunal 
declared the constitutionality of these statutory provisions. According to its position, “assemblies of a cyclical 
nature have a constitutionally legitimate aim and shall be recognized as events of great importance for the 
protection of the national values proclaimed in the Preamble of the Constitution. The Tribunal stressed that 
due to the connection with a Nations’ values and the history of the Homeland, the precedence given such 
assemblies over other assemblies shall be guaranteed for this new type of assembly.” Id. at 34. The 
judgment’s justification also confirmed the broad margin of discretion given to the parliament in the area of 
freedom of assembly. The Tribunal also underlined its lack of competence to assess the constitutionality of 
the rationale or aim of parliamentary acts. This judgment has been strongly criticized by the legally elected 
judges and one of the judges elected in December 2015. The dissenting opinions underlined the 
unconstitutionality of the Tribunal’s composition (three legally elected judges were not allowed to adjudicate; 
and the judgment was delivered in the presence of three persons who were not judges). Moreover, it was also 
pointed out that national and historical values, abstractly understood, should not be recognized as a 
constitutionally legitimate justification for the absolute priority of assemblies de facto of a governmental 
character. The judgment gives a clear signal of the change in the Tribunal’s case law. First, the core of the 
justification was based on national values of high importance to the Homeland and its history. Second, the 
Tribunal did not carry out the full proportionality and equality tests. Third, the Tribunal accepted the absolute 
priority of the only one type of assembly and automatically excluded the right to counter-demonstrate. Article 
57 of the Constitution does not authorize the parliament to specify an abstract hierarchy of assemblies due to 
their national or historical aims. Rozdział II, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. For more criticism of 
the judgment, see Monika Florczak-Wątor, Commentary on the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Judgment 
of 16th March 2017, Case No. Kp 1/17, 2 PRZEGLĄD KONSTYTUCYJNY 120 (2018), 
http://www.przeglad.konstytucyjny.law.uj.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/PKonst_2_2018_120-
147.pdf.  
112  See Lech Morawski, A Critical Response, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (June 3, 2017) 
https://verfassungsblog.de/a-critical-response.  
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questioned by the opposition parties and thousands of people on the streets,113 
as well as many scholars.114 Another “parallel judge” strongly supported the 
governmental party’s criticism of the Ombudsman’s efforts on behalf of 
human rights’ protection and publicly called for the Sejm to dismiss the 
Ombudsman.115 Recently, the same “parallel judge” also argued that one of 
the “old judges” of the Tribunal, legally elected in 2010 by the Sejm of 6th 
term, should not be a judge because she was appointed by the Speaker of the 
Sejm (acting as a President of the Republic in accordance with the Article 131 
of the Constitution) instead of being sworn in personally before the President 
of the Republic.116 Finally, the “parallel judges” were designated by Julia 
Przyłębska to assess the constitutionality of the legal basis of three of the “old 
judges” election (case No. U 1/17 has been submitted by the Prosecutor 
General and is still pending). It should also be noted that the prosecutor’s 
application based on assumptions which interfere with the wording of legal 
provisions and well-established parliamentary custom in judges’ election 
proceedings. Acceptance of the Prosecutor’s arguments by the panel of 
“parallel judges” may open up the possibility to remove the three “old judges” 
from the Tribunal and would give Sejm of the 8th term the opportunity to elect 
yet three more members of the Tribunal.  
2. “Parallel Vice-President” of the Tribunal 
Another example of a parallel institution created by the Sejm of the 8th 
term in order to circumvent the Constitution is the office of a judge “acting as 
a President of the Constitutional Tribunal” instead of the Vice-President of 
the Tribunal.117 From a theoretical point of view, there is nothing controversial 
when one of the constitutional court judges acts in the absence of the 
chairperson or vice-chairperson of the court (i.e., until the next election of the 
                                                          
113  See Rick Lyman, In Poland, an Assault on the Courts Provokes Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/europe/poland-courts-law-and-justice-party.html; Rick 
Lyman & Joanna Berendt, Poland’s Court Crisis Cools Off, but It’s Far From Over, NEW YORK TIMES (July 
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/europe/poland-court-protests-andrzej-duda.html. 
114  See Wojciech Sadurski & Martin Steinbeis, What is Going on in Poland is an Attack against 
Democracy, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 15, 2016), https://verfassungsblog.de/what-is-going-on-in-poland-is-
an-attack-against-democracy. See also Statement by the former Presidents of the Constitutional Tribunal: 
Marek Safjan, Jerzy Stępień, Bohdan Zdziennicki, and Andrzej Zoll, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM POLITICS WORKING GROUP (Nov. 29, 2016), https://blogs.eui.eu/constitutionalism-
politics-working-group/2016/11/29/statement-former-presidents-constitutional-tribunal-marek-safjan-jerzy-
stepien-bohdan-zdziennicki-andrzej-zoll. 
115  See K 9/16 of Mar. 22, 2018, of the Constitutional Tribunal (Mariusz Muszyński, dissenting). 
116  See U 1/16 of May 10, 2018, of the Constitutional Tribunal (Mariusz Muszyński, dissenting). 
117  See Provisions on Introduction of the Act on the Organization and Proceedings before the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal Status Act, supra note 66, at item 2074.  
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(vice) chairperson). However, this is not so in the Polish case. The real aim of 
creating the position of “judge acting as a President” was to prevent the then-
Vice-President of the Tribunal from exercising his constitutional and statutory 
competences until the election of a new President.118 Moreover, the statutory 
conditions for the position of “judge acting as a President” were designed by 
the Sejm in such a way that they de facto had only one person qualified for 
the position.119  
Once again, to provide sufficient background information, we have to 
go back to November 2016 and recall the relevant provisions and facts. One 
month before the end of the term of the then-President of the Tribunal Andrzej 
Rzepliński, transitional statutory provisions on the Constitutional Tribunal 
were adopted by the Sejm in order to create a special legal basis for the 
election of the next President of the Tribunal.120 They were aimed to replace 
the existing constitutional121 and statutory rules.122 The old rules empowered 
the Vice-President of the Tribunal to order the election. However, Stanisław 
Biernat, then Vice-President of the Tribunal, adjudicated the 
unconstitutionality of all statutes on the Tribunal which had been adopted in 
2015 and 2016, and strongly opposed the “parallel judges.”123 Being aware of 
it, the Sejm of the 8th term decided to create a special position in the Tribunal 
for Julia Przyłębska, whose acceptance of the “parallel judges” and other acts 
of the Sejm was evidenced by her dissenting opinion to the judgment delivered 
by the Tribunal in 2016.124 Later she was appointed for the position of “judge 
acting as a President” by the President of the Republic on December 20, 
2016.125  
The provisions concerning the “judge acting as a President,” as well as 
the nomination by the President of the Republic of Julia Przyłębska for the 
position, violated the constitutional principle of judicial independence and 
Article 194(2) of the Constitution. First, in contrast to the statutory provision 
for the institution of “judge acting as a President,” the Vice-President of the 
                                                          
118  Id. at art. 17(1). See also id. at art. 18. 
119  Id. at art. 17(2). 
120  Id. at art. 21. 
121  Art. 194(2), Rozdział VIII, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej; see also K 44/16 of Nov. 7, 2016 
of the Constitutional Tribunal (unpublished opinion). 
122  See Act of July 22, 2016, on the Constitutional Tribunal (Journal of Laws 2016, item 1157). 
123  See K 47/15 of Mar. 9, 2016, of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
124  See SK 2/15 of June 21, 2016, of the Constitutional Tribunal (Julia Przyłębska, dissenting). 
125  Decision No. 1131.24.2016 of the President of the Republic of Poland of Dec. 20, 2016, on the 
delegation of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal’s duties (Monitor Polski 2016, item 1229). 
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Tribunal is directly mentioned in the constitutional provisions. According to 
a well-established interpretation and custom,126 his or her obligation is to act 
in absence of the President of the Tribunal. Second, in accordance with the 
statutory provisions the “judge acting as a President” was nominated by the 
President of the Republic, which violated the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers. It should be underlined that the Constitution provides a 
comprehensive list of situations where the head of the state may—or may 
not—have an impact on the Tribunal.127 Third, the statutory provisions on 
“judge acting as a President” unconstitutionally involve governmental 
interference in the Tribunal’s internal matters. It should again be underlined 
that Julia Przyłębska’s nomination was validated by the countersigning of the 
Prime Minister,128 whereas under the Constitution the government is 
unconditionally excluded from all matters related to the Tribunal’s internal 
organisation.129 The fourth reason given is that the criteria for the position of 
“judge acting as a President” are clearly of a discriminatory character. As has 
been mentioned, there was only one person in the Tribunal that fulfilled all 
the criteria.  
The position of the “parallel Vice-President” (“judge acting as a 
President”) was invented by the Sejm of the 8th term to organize the election 
for the position of President of the Tribunal in December 2016 and to allow 
“parallel judges” to join the bench at the same time. Julia Przyłębska, in her 
role of the acting President of the Tribunal, a day after her nomination 
hurriedly organized a General Assembly of Constitutional Tribunal Judges, 
which elected her as candidate for the position of President of the Tribunal. 
She received five votes in favour from the “parallel judges,” one of the judges 
elected by the Sejm of the 8th term, and one from herself. It should be noted 
that eight of the legally-elected judges refused to join the voting and submitted 
a dissenting opinion. They argued that the two legally elected judges and three 
“parallel judges” had no legitimacy to designate a candidate for the President 
of the Tribunal. In addition, there was no quorum to decide on such a matter. 
Moreover, the Assembly was called only a few hours in advance, in violation 
                                                          
126  See KRZYSZTOF WOJTYCZEK, SĄDOWNICTWO KONSTYTUCYJNE W POLSCE. WYBRANE ZAGADNIENIA 
99 (2013); MĄCZYŃSKI & PODKOWIK, supra note 105, at 1287. 
127  See art. 194(2), Rozdział VIII, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. See also 144 (3), Rozdział 
V, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
128  According to Article 144(2) of the Constitution: “Official Acts of the President shall require, for 
their validity, the signature of the Prime Minister who, by such signature, accepts responsibility therefor to 
the Sejm.” Rozdział V, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
129  See art. 188–197, Rozdział VIII, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. See also art. 144 (2–3), 
Rozdział V, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
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of the statutory terms for reflection and notification of the potential 
candidates.130 
3. “Parallel” President of the Supreme Court 
In a similar fashion as in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
statutory concept of “judge acting as a President” instead of the Vice-
President was also used by the Sejm of the 8th term during the reform of the 
Supreme Court.131 The position of “judge acting as a First President of the 
Supreme Court” was introduced for the first time into the Polish legal system.  
In order to explain the rationale of such a parallel institution, we have 
to recall that, according to the new law on the Supreme Court, all judges sixty-
five years old or older shall be retired unless the President of the Republic 
gives them his or her consent for an extended public service after the statute 
enters into force. This provision shall be applied to the First President of the 
Supreme Court (who opposed the partially unconstitutional reform of the 
judiciary made by the Sejm of the 8th term). Normally, after her resignation 
or the end of her term, the judicial business and administration of the Supreme 
Court shall be directed by the one of Presidents of the Court (one of the heads 
of the Supreme Court’s Chambers). However, such a “normal” solution would 
not give the President of the Republic full control over the reform of the 
Supreme Court. Therefore, the position of “judge acting as a First President 
of the Supreme Court” was introduced.132 No statutory conditions for a 
candidate were provided. A “Judge acting as a President of the Supreme 
Court” may be nominated from the group of Supreme Court judges at the 
unlimited discretion of the President of the Republic.133 
The above-mentioned regulations may be applied not only in the case 
where the First President of the Court retires, but also to all Presidents of the 
Supreme Court. This means that President of the Republic is granted 
unfettered discretion to decide who shall direct the Chambers of the Court.  
                                                          
130  See Protocol of the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal of Dec. 20, 2016, 
supra note 108. 
131  Act on the Supreme Court of Dec. 8, 2017. 
132  Id. at art. 111a. 
133  Id. at art. 111(4). 
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4. “Parallel” National Council of Radio Broadcasting and 
Television 
The fourth example of a parallel institution is The National Media 
Council, which was created by a special statute134 in order to disempower the 
constitutional body—the National Council of Radio Broadcasting and 
Television—by endowing the former with many of the tasks of the latter.135 
According to Article 213(1) of the Constitution, “The National Council of 
Radio Broadcasting and Television shall safeguard the freedom of speech, the 
right to information as well as safeguard the public interest regarding radio 
broadcasting and television.” The National Media Council is also empowered 
to control national broadcasters (Polish Television, Polish Radio and the 
Polish Press Agency) by means of its competence to appoint or dismiss 
presidents, members of supervisory boards and management boards, as well 
as other members of the public broadcasters’ statutory bodies. The National 
Media Council also has access to “key broadcasters’ documents and acts in a 
similar way to the supervisory board. Council members also have the right to 
participate in general meetings of companies’ statutory bodies.”136 It should 
be noted that during the first year of its activity the National Media Council 
adopted, inter alia, resolutions dismissing: the President of the Management 
Board of Polish Television, the members of the Management Board of the 
Polish Press Agency, the President of the Board of Polish Radio, the members 
of the Board of Polish Radio, as well as passed resolutions creating new 
advisory boards and new statutes for public broadcasters.137  
B. The Instrumental Use of Vacatio Legis 
There are two constitutional provisions which determine the entry into 
force of statutes. First, according to Article 88(1) of the Constitution,138 the 
promulgation of a statute is a condition for its entry into force. Second, taking 
into account that it is the President’s obligation to order the promulgation of 
                                                          
134  Art. 1, Act on the National Media Council of June 22, 2016 (Journal of Laws 2016, item 929).  
135  Sadurski, supra note 18, at 11.  
136  Id. at 12. 
137  Id. 
138 Article 88 of the Constitution: “1. The condition precedent for the coming into force of statutes, 
regulations and enactments of local law shall be the promulgation thereof. 2. The principles of and procedures 
for promulgation of normative acts shall be specified by statute. 3. International agreements ratified with 
prior consent granted by statute shall be promulgated in accordance with the procedures required for statutes. 
The principles of promulgation of other international agreements shall be specified by statute.” Rozdział III, 
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
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all statutes submitted by the Speaker after their adoption by the Sejm (Article 
122 of the Constitution139), the constitutional provisions guarantee that 
statutes do not enter into force before their official promulgation, and 
especially on the day of their adoption by the Sejm. Therefore, just like in 
many other countries, statutes may enter into force either on the day of 
promulgation or on a subsequent date.   
There is no doubt that it is an authority or a right of the legislative 
branch to decide on the moment when statutes enter into force. However, 
according to the well-established constitutional case-law, such a competence 
is substantially limited by the interpretation and development of the 
constitutional principle of a democratic state ruled by law. In the words of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, the period between a statute’s promulgation and its 
entry into force (vacatio legis) shall always be “reasonable and adequate to 
the scope of a new regulation.”140 The legislators should especially take into 
account the complexity of a new regulation, its differences from the previous 
one(s), and the real-life ability to adapt to its entry into force by persons to 
whom the regulation is directed.141 Constitutional case-law has confirmed that 
the shortening of the vacatio legis period can be justified only by the direct 
necessity of implementation of a constitutional principle,142 especially in order 
to: a) protect the budgetary balance of the State;143 b) repeal provisions 
recognised as unconstitutional by the Ombudsman or other constitutional 
bodies;144 c) execute a Constitutional Tribunal judgment and restore a 
condition of constitutionality;145 or d) develop a social insurance system. It is 
a principle of the applicable case-law that statutes imposing limitations on 
human rights and freedoms shall not enter into force before fourteen days after 
their promulgation, or before thirty days in the case of statutes concerning 
annual taxes. Moreover, the competence of the legislative power to decide on 
the moment when statutes enter into force is also restricted by the statutory 
principles referred in Article 88(2) of the Constitution.146 According to these 
provisions, a statute shall enter into force within fourteen days after its 
                                                          
139 Article 122 (1-2) of the Constitution: “1. After the completion of the procedure specified in Article 
121, the Marshal of the Sejm shall submit an adopted bill to the President of the Republic for signature. 2. 
The President of the Republic shall sign a bill within 21 days of its submission and shall order its 
promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw).” Rozdział IV, Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
140  Kp 6/09 of Jan. 20, 2010, of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
141  Id.  
142  K 14/07 of June 30, 2009, of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
143  P 4/98 of June 16, 1999, of the Constitutional Tribunal.  
144  K 14/07 of June 30, 2009, of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
145  Kp 1/13 of July 24, 2013, of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
146  Article 122 (1-2), Rozdział IV, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 
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promulgation. In an extraordinary situation, the Sejm may decide on an earlier 
or later date when a statute will enter into force (for example within seven or 
eight days after the promulgation). A statute may also enter into force on the 
day of promulgation when it is absolutely necessary to protect the interest of 
the State and does not violate the rule of law principle. 
Considering the above, we will now examine the situation that took 
place after the 2015 election in Poland, when the Sejm of the 8th term adopted 
several important statutes with either no or a very short vacatio legis period. 
We posit that all the Sejm’s efforts in this regard were aimed at bringing about 
a permanent and irreversible unconstitutional change in the status of legal 
institutions.  
1. Lack of Vacatio Legis During the Reforms of the 
Constitutional Tribunal 
The first example is the amendment of December 22, 2015, of the 
statute of the Constitutional Tribunal,147 which entered into force the next day 
after its publication in the Journal of Laws. This amendment introduced 
several highly important changes in the Tribunal’s proceedings and modified 
the election rules with respect to the President of the Tribunal, as well as 
provided new conditions for the dismissal of a judge on the Tribunal. The first 
group of changes included: a) an obligation to hear a case by a full panel of 
the Tribunal;148 b) a requirement of a thirteen-judge quorum to hear a case, 
and a ten-judge quorum to issue a judgment by the full panel of the 
Tribunal;149 c) a six-month period between a notification of a hearing and its 
date.150 The second group of new provisions limited the right of a Tribunal 
judge to nominate a “candidate for a candidate” for the position of President 
of the Tribunal.151 Finally, the amendment gave the Sejm a competence to 
dismiss a judge (“in the most blatant cases”),152 as well as authorized the 
President of the Republic and Prosecutor General to submit a motion for 
disciplinary proceedings against a judge of the Tribunal.153  
                                                          
147  Act of Dec. 22, 2015, amending the Constitutional Tribunal Act (2015 r. Dz. U., poz. 2217).  
148  Id. at art. 1(9). 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at art. 1(12). 
151  Id. at art. 1(4). 
152  Id. at art. 1(7). 
153  Id. at art. 1(5). 
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The fact that the above-mentioned provisions were adopted just after 
the Sejm of the 8th term had elected three “parallel judges” suggests that the 
lack of vacatio legis was intentionally introduced to force (under the threat of 
sanctions) the Tribunal to involve the “parallel judges” immediately after the 
amendment entered into force. It should be noted that they were not allowed 
to join the panel at that time due to the constitutionally-justified objections 
raised by then-President of the Tribunal.154 According to the new provisions, 
hearing a case without them might be recognized as a “most blatant case” by 
the Sejm and authorize the President and/or the Prosecutor General to submit 
a motion for disciplinary proceedings both against the then-President of the 
Tribunal and all judges of the panel.  
A similar example of the adoption of an instrumental approach to 
vacatio legis may be found in the statute of December 13, 2016,155 on the 
implementation of the statute on the Tribunal proceedings and the statute on 
the status of Tribunal judges. Formally, a fourteen-day vacatio legis period 
had been directly introduced by the law. However, the Sejm of the 8th term 
provided exceptions for more than half of the provisions of the statute of 
December 13, 2016, which entered into force the following day after their 
publication in the Journal of Laws.  
The statute of December 13, 2016, was part of the Sejm’s reform of the 
Tribunal. The provisions that entered into effect immediately after 
promulgation referred to the appointment of a “parallel” Vice-President of the 
Tribunal and his or her competences, and to the new election rules for the 
position of President of the Tribunal.156 They were directly aimed at: allowing 
the “parallel judges” to adjudicate;157 excluding the Vice-President of the 
Tribunal;158 and to help one of the persons elected by the Sejm of the 8th term 
to win an election for the new President of the Tribunal.159 The special 
provisions on annulment of the acts of the General Assembly of Constitutional 
Tribunal Judges, which had been adopted in order to elect the President of the 
Tribunal, also entered into force with no vacatio legis.  
                                                          
154  See K 34/15 of Dec. 3, 2015, of the Constitutional Tribunal.  
155 Act of Dec. 13, 2016—Provisions on Introduction of the Act on the Organization and Proceedings 
before the Constitutional Tribunal and the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal Status Act. 
156  Id. at art. 1. See also id. at arts. 22–23. 
157  Id. at art. 21.  
158  Id. at arts. 16–18. 
159  Id. at arts. 20–21. 
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A careful reading of the above-mentioned provisions in their historical 
context makes it possible to argue that the lack of vacatio legis was 
particularly aimed at interrupting the election of the President of the Tribunal, 
a process which had been started by the General Assembly of Tribunal Judges 
in November 2016. It should be noted that Sejm of the 8th term attempted, 
already in the middle of 2016, to change the statutory provisions on election 
rules for the President of the Tribunal position in order to prevent judges 
elected by the previous terms of parliament from becoming the next President 
of the Tribunal.160 This attempt was questioned before the Tribunal by the 
parliamentary opposition parties. Formally, the Tribunal ruled on the 
constitutionality of the questioned provisions in case No. K 44/16,161 but 
substantively it gave a pro-constitutional interpretation of the statutory 
provisions in an operative part of its judgment. It allowed the General 
Assembly of Tribunal Judges to organize the election for the President of the 
Tribunal position after the end of judge Andrzej Rzepliński’s term.162 
Although the government (unconstitutionally) refused to publish the 
judgment, the General Assembly of Tribunal Judges elected candidates for the 
position of President of the Tribunal,163 acting directly within the framework 
of existing constitutional and statutory provisions. Therefore, to prevent one 
of the “old judges” from becoming the President of the Tribunal, the Sejm of 
the 8th term decided on a statutory annulment of this election. In addition to 
the fact the statute substantively violated the principle of judicial 
independence, it is hard to argue that the lack of vacatio legis was 
constitutionally justified. It was directly aimed at introducing the “parallel” 
institutions and at changing the acts of the General Assembly of the Tribunal 
Judges. Such a motive cannot be recognized as a necessity in the interest of 
protection of the State. 
2. Lack of Vacatio Legis During the Supreme Court Reform 
AnotherAnother example of taking an instrumental approach to vacatio 
legis concerns the amendment of April 12, 2018, of the Supreme Court 
statute,164 which entered into force the following day after its publication in 
the Journal of Laws. The amendment introduced the institution of a “parallel” 
                                                          
160  Act of July 22, 2016, on the Constitutional Tribunal.  
161  K 44/16 of Nov. 7, 2016, of the Constitutional Tribunal.  
162  See Press Release, Constitutional Tribunal, Rules for appointing the President and Vice-President 
of the Constitutional Tribunal (Nov. 8, 2016).  
163  See Art. 16, Act of July 22, 2016, on the Constitutional Tribunal (Journal of Laws 2016, item 1157).  
164  Act of Apr. 12, 2018, amending the Act on the Supreme Court (Journal of Laws 2018, item. 847). 
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President of the Supreme Court.165 It also safeguarded financing for a new 
Disciplinary Panel of the Supreme Court, which had been ordered to rule in 
cases of disciplinary proceedings of Supreme Court judges.166 Moreover, the 
amendment directly annulled the election of the First President of the Supreme 
Court and the Presidents of the Court which had taken place before the 
amendment entered into force.167 
As was the case with respect to the Constitutional Tribunal, the Sejm 
of the 8th term directly violated the constitutional principle of judicial 
independence by its statutory annulment of the election of the President of the 
Supreme Court and shortened the vacatio legis with no constitutional 
justification.  
3. Lack of Vacatio Legis During the Reform of the National 
Media 
Another example is the amendment of December 30, 2015, of the radio 
and television statute,168 which also entered into force the following day after 
its publication in the Journal of Laws. The amendment shortened ex lege all 
terms of the public media management and supervisory boards. Moreover, the 
new provisions changed the rules governing the appointment and dismissal of 
persons in the highest positions in public media companies.  
The amendment was part of the public media reform launched by the 
parliamentary majority after the election in 2015.169 It was expected to prepare 
the terrain for a statute on the National Media Council and a new statute on 
the National Media.170 In regards to the first statute,171 the Sejm decided to 
shorten the vacatio legis period and allow National Media Council to act (i.e., 
to appoint or to dismiss presidents, members of supervisory boards and 
management boards as well as other members of public broadcaster’s 
statutory bodies) seven days after promulgation of the statute.  
                                                          
165  Id. at art. 1. 
166  Id. at art. 4. 
167  Id. at art. 2. 
168  Act of Dec. 30, 2015, amending the Act on Radio and Television (Journal of Laws 2016, item 25).  
169  As Wojciech Sadurski observed, “public media have been transferred into governmental propaganda 
machine, with no attempt to pretend that the opposition views are presented objectively and neutrally. 
Immediately after PiS came to power, some 200 journalists were purged from public TV and radio, and 
replaced mainly with journalists coming from fringe right-wing media.” Sadurski, supra note 18 at 47. 
170  See Law on National Media (Draft), 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/BE8E7FB04FB3B43EC1257FA0003E170E/%24File/442.pdf. 
171  Art. 1, Act on the National Media Council of June 22, 2016 (Journal of Laws 2016, item 929). 
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A careful reading of the amendment of December 30, 2015 and the 
statute on the National Media Council in the context of the draft law on 
National Media makes it feasible to argue that the lack of vacatio legis (in the 
case of the amendment) and the shortening of it (in case of the second-
mentioned statute) were introduced in order to terminate the employment of 
all members of the management boards. Considering the scope of the 
provisions, it is difficult to argue that the immediate entry into force of the 
statute was justified by the necessity to protect the State’s interest. There were 
no constitutionally legitimate reasons to shorten the vacatio legis period. 
C. The Instrumental Approach to Transitional Provisions 
 There is no direct constitutional regulation referring to the standards of 
transitional provisions in Poland. However, it is a part of the Polish legal 
culture and a consequence of well-established interpretation of the Rechtsstaat 
principle (Article 2 of the Constitution) that legislative power acts in 
conformity with the Polish “Principles of Legislative Technique.”172 In this 
light, transitional provisions produce effects on new statutes relating to facts 
or legal relationships that had been established under previous statutes. The 
transitional provisions shall particularly specify: a) how to finish pending 
cases that started before the amendment or enactment of a statute; b) whether 
to maintain legal institutions that were abolished by a new law; c) in what 
manner and to what extent previous competences or acts shall still be in force. 
The general aim of transitional provisions is to avoid legal chaos in cases of 
amendment of a statute or enactment of a new statute, as well as ensure the 
efficiency of public bodies. 
1. Provisions on the President and Vice-President of the 
Constitutional Tribunal 
As our first example of the instrumental approach to transitional 
provisions, we note the amendment of November 19, 2015, of the 
Constitutional Tribunal statute, which provided that the terms of the then-
President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal (Judges Andrzej 
Rzepliński and Stanisław Biernat), would end three months after the statute 
                                                          
172  Ordinance of the Prime Minister of June 20, 2002, Concerning the Principles of Legislative 
Technique (Journal of Laws 2002, item 908). 
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entered into force. This provision was adopted by the Sejm of the 8th term 
just after the general election, at the beginning of the constitutional crisis.173 
It was questioned by the parliamentary opposition before the Tribunal, 
which then ruled on the constitutionality of the statutory early dismissal of a 
constitutional authority.174 According to the Tribunal’s judgment:  
[T]he period of holding the position [of President or Vice-
President of the Tribunal] was directly determined by the 
provisions of the Constitution as well as by an individual and 
specific act of the President of Poland, by means of which s/he 
appointed, to those positions, candidates selected by the General 
Assembly of the Judges of the Tribunal. The period of holding 
the said positions which is determined in the said way is subject 
to constitutional protection in a similar way in which the term of 
office of incumbent officials is protected. Thus, from the moment 
of appointment by the President of Poland until the loss of the 
status of a judge of the Tribunal, a person holding the said office 
is subject to protection, the scope of which comprises, inter alia, 
a guarantee of the stability of exercising the office to which the 
said person was appointed. . . . In its previous jurisprudence, the 
Tribunal also indicated that “possible changes in the length of the 
term of office should have pro futuro effects, i.e. with regard to 
authorities that will be elected in the future.” . . . From that point 
of view, the challenged Article 2 of the Act of 19 November 2015 
also constitutes the legislator’s interference into the 
constitutional competence of the President of Poland to appoint 
the President and Vice-President of the Tribunal. . . . since at the 
constitutional level, the constitution-maker determined that the 
course of filling vacancies in said positions is based on the 
division of powers between the General Assembly of the Judges 
of the Constitutional Tribunal (the exclusive power to take the 
initiative in this respect) and the President of Poland (the 
exclusive power to take decisions), thus the legislator may not, 
by means of a normative act, eliminate the effects of the exercise 
of the said powers and, in a sense, in a retroactive way interfere 
in the act of appointment carried out by the President of Poland. 
. . . Taking into account the fact that—on the one hand—the 
                                                          
173  See also Chmielarz-Grochal & Sułkowski, supra note 94, passim. 
174  K 35/15 of Dec. 9, 2015, of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
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length of the period in every case is possible to be reconstructed 
and—on the other hand—that the guarantee of stability in the 
performance of duties by the President and Vice-President of the 
Tribunal constitutes a significant guarantee of the independence 
of the constitutional court, the Tribunal agrees with the 
applicants’ stance.175 
Therefore, the above-mentioned transitional provisions, when read in the 
context explained in the case no K 35/15, did not comply with the rationale of 
such types of provisions.  
2. Provisions on the Proceedings Before the Constitutional 
Tribunal 
Another example of the instrumental approach to a transitional 
provision is contained in the statute of July 22, 2016, on the Constitutional 
Tribunal.176 It introduced completely new proceedings before the Tribunal, 
with a fourteen-day vacatio legis for its proper implementation. It should be 
underlined that part of statutory provisions provided for new legal institutions 
such as: a) the requirement that a full bench of the Tribunal should adjudicate 
in cases where three judges of the Tribunal file a relevant motion;177 b) the 
obligation to hear a case only upon the attendance of the Prosecutor-
General;178 c) terms for judges of the Tribunal to raise an objection to a draft-
                                                          
175  Id. at ¶ 8.7.3.  
176  Act of July 22, 2016, on the Constitutional Tribunal (Journal of Laws 2016, item 1157). 
177  The Tribunal found this provision unconstitutional in case No. K 39/16. See K 39/16 of Aug. 11, 
2016, of the Constitutional Tribunal. The assessment, based on three arguments, referred to the constitutional 
principle of the efficiency of public office (Preamble to the Constitution). Firstly, the legislator violated the 
requirement of efficiency in the work of a public institution. A motion for adjudication by the full bench had 
an immediate ex lege effect and did not have to be justified in a substantive way, nor was it subject to 
evaluation by the President of the Tribunal. Secondly, the Tribunal found a violation of the requirement of 
diligence in the work of the public institution. The legislator turned an exception, i.e. the consideration of a 
case by a full bench of the Tribunal, into a general rule. Thirdly, the there was an infringement of the 
requirement of effectiveness in the work of a public institution. The assessed provisions provided for a 
situation where all cases would be referred for consideration by a full bench of the Tribunal. Also see the 
press release after the hearing before the Constitutional Tribunal in case No. K 39/16. 
178  The Tribunal found this provision unconstitutional in case No. K 39/16. See K 39/16 of Aug. 11, 
2016, of the Constitutional Tribunal. The main argument of the Tribunal was that in the event of the absence 
of the Public Prosecutor-General, the Tribunal could only adjourn the hearing and set a new date for the 
hearing. Thus, the correlation between the Tribunal’s capacity to review the constitutionality of law with the 
actions taken by the Public Prosecutor-General might make it impossible for the Tribunal to issue a ruling in 
a case considered by a full bench of the Tribunal. The legislator does not place a time-limit on the effect of 
the absence of the Public Prosecutor-General, or his/her representative, at a hearing when said persons have 
been notified in a proper way, and so the consideration of a case might be suspended for an indefinite period. 
Also see the press release after the hearing before the Constitutional Tribunal in case No. K 39/16. 
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judgment, which implies an obligation to hear the case by a full bench of the 
Tribunal.179  
The transitional provisions of the statute of July 22, 2016: a) imposed 
an obligation to hear all pending cases by the Tribunal within one year from 
the date of entry into force of the 2016 statute;180 b) imposed an obligation to 
hear all cases according to the new rules; c) ordered the President of the 
Tribunal to include “parallel judges” into the panel of the Tribunal; d) ordered 
the Tribunal to suspend the proceedings for six months in all cases submitted 
by the Ombudsman and parliamentary opposition; and e) divided the 
Tribunal’s judgments into those that were to be published in the official 
journal and those that would not be published.  
It is clearly visible that the scope of the above-mentioned transitional 
provisions, read in the context of the deep substantive changes in Tribunal’s 
proceedings and the short vacatio legis, was designed by the Sejm of the 8th 
term in order to disturb the regular work of the Tribunal and to prevent it from 
ruling on the constitutionality of the new statute before it entered into force. 
Also, having regard to the fact that the Sejm again tried to force the Tribunal 
to include “parallel judges” into the adjudicating panel, it is difficult to argue 
that it was not an abuse to use the transitional provisions in order to achieve 
the ruling majority’s goals.  
 
                                                          
179 The Tribunal ruled this provision unconstitutional in case No. K 39/16. See K 39/16 of Aug. 11, 
2016, of the Constitutional Tribunal. The assessment, based on three arguments, referred to the constitutional 
principle of public office efficiency. Firstly, the legislator did not specify ratione personae, materiae and 
temporis restrictions applicable to an objection to a proposed determination with regard to a case considered 
by a full bench of the Tribunal. Secondly, the said objection did not have to be justified. Thirdly, application 
of the challenged provision would make it impossible to issue rulings forthwith in cases in which no 
objections were raised. Also see the press release after the hearing in case No. K 39/16. 
180  The Tribunal found this provision unconstitutional in case No. K 39/16. See K 39/16 of Aug. 11, 
2016, of the Constitutional Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s opinion, the short time-limit would make it impossible 
for the Tribunal to consider a case diligently, as is required by the Constitution. Indeed, on the one hand the 
legislator introduced the requirement that all the aforementioned cases should be considered within a year, 
but on the other hand he also introduced solutions that would prevent the Tribunal from issuing a ruling 
within the same one-year time-limit for reasons that would be beyond the Tribunal’s control. It is possible to 
specify in the provisions of the Constitution a maximum period for considering a case by the Tribunal; so 
far, the only example of such solution has been in Article 224(2) of the Constitution. Rozdział X, Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. An exception to this rule may not be introduced by statute. The prohibition against 
specifying the said maximum period by statute arises from the principle of the tri-partite division of powers, 
as such action would be a form of interference on the part of the legislature with a core activity of the 
judiciary. Also see the press release after the hearing in case No. K 39/16. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The 2015-2018 period will be long remembered in the history of Polish 
constitutionalism. It brought about numerous reinterpretations of basic 
constitutional principles, in particular with regard to the separation of powers, 
national sovereignty, and the principle of the final and universally binding 
character of judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal. These reinterpretations 
broke with the well-established jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal 
and constitutional law theories. The durability of these reinterpretations will 
be tested in the future. However, the 2015-2018 period should be interesting 
for anyone—including persons outside Poland—who wishes to familiarize 
him or herself with the types of legal techniques that can be used by a ruling 
parliamentary majority to undermine the system of liberal democracy without 
recourse to the constitutional amendment procedure. The Polish experience is 
worth studying since it offers examples of techniques which are capable of 
application in other countries. To exclude the possibility of the emergence of 
the process which we call statutory anti-constitutionalism, one must make sure 
that both the legal culture and the independence of judiciary have strong basis 
in his or her country. Both aspects are likely to fade today if illiberal 
movements gain strength in old Western democracies. 
